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ARTICLES
REMOVING THE BIAS AGAINST REMOVAL
Scott R. Haiber+
"That there is no other phase of American jurisprudence with
so many refinements and subtleties, as relate to removal
proceedings, is known by all who have to deal with them."'
"After all, procedure is instrumental; it is the means of
effectuating policy." 2
1.

INTRODUCTION

The dramatic growth in the caseload of federal courts over the last
century has been well documented and, in general, bemoaned.'
Nonetheless, those troubled by expanding federal dockets can point to
one significant but largely unnoticed success. Throughout the twentieth
century, federal courts consistently and methodically limited the
availability of federal removal jurisdiction. Coupling supposed statutory
ambiguities with judicial presumptions favoring remand to state court,
federal courts littered the removal landscape with a daunting array of
procedural landmines for the litigator to navigate. These judicially
created landmines have kept a large number of cases off the federal
docket.
Predictably, procedural obstacles to removal also provide increased
opportunities for plaintiffs to manipulate federal jurisdiction in arbitrary
ways. Thus, plaintiffs often successfully prevent removal by utilizing
such devices as disguising federal claims as state claims, delaying service
The author, a member of the Maryland Bar and the Delaware Bar, is a principal in the
firm of Miles & Stockbridge, P.C.. The views expressed in this article are solely those of
the author.
1. Hagerla v. Miss. River Power Co., 202 F. 771,773 (S.D. Iowa 1912).
+

2. FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME
COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 2 (1928).
3. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM,

53-86 (1996) (describing that growth); see also J.Harvie Wikinson III, The Drawbacks of
Growth In The FederalJudiciary, 43 EMORY L.J. 1147, 1147 (1994) ("Unrestrained growth
in personnel and jurisdiction is undermining the effective functioning of the federal
judiciary."); Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future of the
Federal Courts, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1, 3 ("The point is that as a result of people looking to
the federal courts those courts have become overburdened and the system has become
clogged.").
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on certain defendants, intentionally omitting jurisdictional information
from a complaint or suing non-diverse defendants, one of who will be
dropped from the case at a later date.4 Apparently, these strategic
measures have troubled few. Perhaps this is because the end, a reduced
federal docket, justifies the means, artful manipulation of procedural
rules, for a philosophically diverse group of interested observers.
"Conservative" champions of federalism presumably find it awkward to
criticize devices that preserve the jurisdiction of state courts.6 At the
same time, the "liberal" plaintiffs' bar can hardly be expected to criticize
tools that make it easier to pursue claims in state court-their preferred
venue. Nor do federal judges have much incentive to complain about
practices that reduce the workload of overburdened federal courts.
Indeed, the only parties with cause to complain about artificial
procedural obstacles to removal are those defendants unfortunate
enough to trip over them.
Yet gamesmanship has its price The arcana of federal removal law
requires courts and litigants to waste significant resources researching,
litigating, and deciding procedural issues related to forum selection.
More troubling, by encouraging procedural gamesmanship, judicially
created obstacles to removal undermine respect for both the courts and
for the rule of law.9 Some defense attorneys must explain to their clients
that they have been denied their right to a federal forum, not for any
substantive reason, but because the plaintiff's attorney in a would-be
diversity action strategically waited for more than a year before
dismissing a token non-diverse defendant whom the plaintiff never
actually intended to prosecute."' Other defense attorneys must explain to
clients that although the requirements for diversity jurisdiction exist in a
given case, removal cannot be effected because a plaintiff artfully elected
not to disclose in his complaint the citizenship of the parties.' These
awkward situations occur, and serve as a testament to the fact that
federal jurisdiction has become a mere lawyers' game where form
triumphs over substance.
Sadly, this situation is not only illogical and costly, but wholly
unnecessary. The root of the problem appears to lie in collective

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See infra Part IV.
See infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
See infra Part V.B.3.
See infra Part V.B.4.
See infra Part V.B.4.
Id.; see also infra Part V.A.
See infra notes 299-302 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.E.
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amnesia regarding the origin and purpose of removal jurisdiction."
Removal too often is treated as a procedural anomaly that affronts the
dignity of state courts and deprives plaintiffs of their "right" to choose a
forum.' 3 Moreover, removal increases the number of cases before federal
courts involving diversity jurisdiction, which itself often is viewed as an
archaic relic that Congress stubbornly refuses to abolish. 4 Federal courts
therefore scorn removal as a particularly obnoxious form of federal
jurisdiction that should be indulged only when absolutely necessary.
More precisely, federal courts employ a battery of legal presumptions in
favor of remand that have resulted in artificial procedural barriers to
removal.'
In their zeal to trim the federal docket by limiting removal, some
federal courts seemingly have forgotten that removal merely provides a
mechanism for transferring to federal court those cases in which both the
6
Constitution and Congress have authorized original federal jurisdiction.
Many judges also forget that the federal courts were not created solely
for the benefit of plaintiffs.
In fact, the Framers intended rights
conferred by the Constitution, including the right to litigate certain
disputes in a federal forum, to be equally available to all citizens.
Removal therefore serves as a necessary device to ensure that plaintiffs
alone do not decide which cases federal courts hear.' 9 It is only in the
past century that federal courts quietly abandoned this notion and
discovered the superior right of a plaintiff to select unilaterally the forum
of his choice.20
When we recall the true nature and purpose of removal, judicial
hostility toward the use of this device becomes difficult to justify.
Removal does not deprive plaintiffs of any "right," but merely affords
defendants an equal opportunity to litigate in federal court.2' Removal
does not affront fundamental principles of federalism. On the contrary,
it forms an integral component of the original federal scheme created by
the Framers."
Additionally, removal does not expand federal

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See infra Part l.D.
See infra Part II.E.1.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.B.; see also Part V.
See infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 398-99 and accompanying text.
See infra note 406 and accompanying text.
See infra Part V.B.1.
See infra Part V.B.1.
See infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
See infra Part V.B.2.
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jurisdiction, but merely allows cases involving federal jurisdiction to be
heard in a federal court."

Therefore, rather than treating removal as the redheaded stepchild of
federal jurisdiction, federal courts should interpret and apply removal
statutes in a strictly neutral manner. 24 Instead of presuming that all
removed cases should be remanded, federal courts should approach
removal with the understanding that a plaintiff does not possess a
superior "right" to select the forum of his choice.25 Such a judicial change
of heart would help to reconcile the practice of removal with its
underlying purpose. 26 A less hostile judicial view of removal could also
arrest, and might even begin to roll back, the proliferation of judicially
created procedural obstacles to removal. 27 This, in turn, would reduce2
abusive procedural gamesmanship and the cynicism that goes with it. "
That is the argument presented in this article.
First, however, it is necessary to establish certain underlying factual
predicates. Therefore, this article begins by sketching the history of
removal from the Judiciary Act of 1789 to the present day. 9 That history
shows how removal, which was viewed favorably by federal courts in the
nineteenth century, came to be viewed as a dangerous and disfavored
device in the twentieth century.3 ' Attention is then paid to several
procedural obstacles to removal that have been spawned by federal court
presumptions in favor of remand. 3' The policy justifications that
supposedly underly the disfavored status of removal jurisdiction, and that
ultimately justify procedural obstacles to removal, are then examined. 2
Finally, this article argues for a changed attitude towards removal and for
the elimination....
of judicially
created procedural obstacles to the exercise
33
of removal jurisdiction.
II.

A SHORT HISTORY OF FEDERAL REMOVAL PRACTICE

Reviewing the history of federal removal practice reveals a few items
that might surprise many federal litigators. First, for at least a century
after the ratification of the Constitution, statutes governing removal
23.

See infra Part V.B.3.

24.

See infra Part VI.A.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

infra Part VI.A.
infra Part VI.A.
infra Part VI.A.
infra Part VI.A.
infra Part II.
infra Part II.E.2.
infra Part V.
infra Part V.B.
infra notes Part VI.
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procedure were construed liberally to avoid a remand based on a
procedural defect.34 Second, during this same period, federal courts
viewed a defendant's removal right as constitutionally based and
certainly no less important than a plaintiff's "right" to select the initial
Third, judicial hostility toward removal appears to have
forum. 35
developed, at least in part, as a byproduct of a more general hostility to
16
diversity jurisdiction.
A.

Prelude: Diversity Jurisdictionand Ratification of the Constitution

The history of removal cannot be separated from that of its close kin,
diversity jurisdiction. Each doctrine dates back to the birth of the
Republic and alternately has expanded and contracted in scope over the
last two centuries. Moreover, removal exists for no other purpose than
to facilitate the exercise of original jurisdiction-particularly diversity
jurisdiction-by the federal courts.37
The notion of diversity jurisdiction first appeared in the so-called
"Virginia Plan," which eventually formed the basis for the Constitution
of the United States. 3 In particular, one of the original resolutions
introduced by Edmund Randolph to the Constitutional Convention on
May 29, 1787 called for the creation of a national judiciary, "to hear...
cases in which foreigners or citizens of other States applying to such
jurisdiction, may be interested., 39 Later, a Committee of Detail
appointed to draft the Judicial Article of the Constitution included
diversity jurisdiction in its proposal to the Convention. 40 That language
eventually was accepted by the Convention with minor alterations and
no visible controversy. 4 '
When the proposed Constitution was submitted to the States for
ratification, Article III, Section 1 stated that, "[t]he judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior42
establish.,
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and

34. See infra notes 65-88 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 65-88, 95 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 256-57 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
38. See Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction,41 HARV. L.
REV. 483,484-85 (1928).
39. See THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
DEBATES, 35, 38 (Ralph Ketcham ed., Penguin Books 1986) [hereinafter ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS].

40.
41.
42.

See Friendly, supra note 38, at 486.
Id.
See U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1.
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Section 2 of Article III in turn defined the federal "judicial Power" as
embracing certain enumerated cases, including those arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States, and those "between Citizens of
different States., 4' However, the proposed Constitution did not vest
diversity jurisdiction in any particular federal court. 4 Nor did it mention
removal or any other procedure that would allow inferior federal courts
to exercise the original jurisdiction authorized by the Constitution.45
During the state debates that preceded ratification of the Constitution,
the proposed federal judiciary received considerable attention.
Federalists argued for an extensive and unified federal judiciary that
would protect federal rights, provide for more uniform decision making,
and eliminate the confusion that had plagued the post-Revolutionary
War period. 4" As Hamilton warned in The FederalistPapers,"[tihirteen
independent courts of final jurisdiction over the same causes, arising
upon the same laws, is a hydra in government,
from which nothing but
47
contradiction and confusion can proceed.
Supporters of a strong federal judiciary also specifically supported the
inclusion of diversity jurisdiction in Article III, as a means of addressing
the problem of local prejudice.
Madison, for example, argued that "a
strong prejudice may arise, in some states, against the citizens of others,
who may have claims against them. 4 9 Hamilton similarly argued that
cases between citizens of different states should be assigned to a federal
court "likely to be impartial between the different states and their
citizens, and which, owing its official existence to the union, will never be
likely to feel any bias inauspicious to the principles on which it is
founded.",50 Nor was it irrational for participants in pre-ratification
debates to entertain fears regarding either the reliability or impartiality
of state courts.' Indeed, under the Articles of Confederation, some state

43. Id. § 2.
44. See id.
45. See id. art. III.
46. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NOs. 22, 78-82 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills
ed., 1982); see generally CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA:
THE STORY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1787 62-64

(1966).
47. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 403 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
48. See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 38, at 492-96.
49. 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS,
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE

GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787 533 (2d ed. 1836).
50. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 403 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).

51. See Michael G. Collins, Judicial Independence and the Scope of Article III-A
View From The Federalist,38 U. RICH. L. REV. 675, 697 (2004) (discussing the fears of
Hamilton and others regarding state courts).
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courts simply declined to enforce federal admiralty decisions. 2 State
courts, particularly those in the South, also were notoriously hostile to
out-of-state creditors."
Of course, not everyone agreed that state court parochialism and
unreliability necessitated the creation of a powerful federal judiciary.
Anti-Federalists argued for a very limited federal judiciary that would
not trample upon the sovereignty of state courts. For example, Patrick
Henry, who refused to attend the Convention in Philadelphia because he
"smelt a rat, 54 viewed the creation of a federal judiciary as the death
knell of state courts: "I see arising out of that paper a tribunal that is to
be recurred to in all cases, when the destruction of the state judiciaries
shall happen; and, from the extensive jurisdiction of these paramount
courts, the state courts must soon be annihilated."55 Similarly, "Brutus"
remarked that "[p]erhaps nothing could have been better conceived to
facilitate the abolition of the state governments than the constitution of
the judicial [branch]. 56
Anti-Federalists singled out diversity jurisdiction for particular
criticism. They argued that the exercise of federal diversity jurisdiction
would cause defendants to incur significant expense in traveling to
distant federal courts) 7 Some critics also feared that diversity jurisdiction
could lead directly to the creation of a body of federal law that would
supplant state law) Although history would prove that such fears were
not entirely groundless,59 they did not prevent the formation of the
Union.
Instead, after a full airing of practical, philosophical, and political
objections, all thirteen original states eventually ratified a Constitution
52. See Wythe Holt, "To Establish Justice": Politics, The Judiciary Act of 1789, and
the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1428.
53. See id. at 1456. Judge Friendly suggested that the true purpose of diversity
jurisdiction was to offer protection not against state courts, but against state legislatures.
See Friendly, supra note 38, at 495. Indeed, there is evidence that the Founders were
concerned with both state laws and the state judiciary. James Wilson, for example, stated
in the Pennsylvania debates on the Constitution: "I would ask how a merchant must feel to
have his property lie at the mercy of the laws of Rhode Island." 2 ELLIOT, supra note 49,
at 491. Nevertheless, the statements of Madison, Hamilton, and others expressly referring
to bias in the state courts are not easily ignored.
54. See DRINKER BOWEN, supra note 46, at 18.
55. See 3 ELLIOT, supra note 49, at 542.
56. "BRUTUS," ESSAY XV (Mar. 20, 1788), reprinted in ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS,
supra note 39, at 308.
57. See Friendly, supra note 38, at 490-91.
58. See id. at 490.
59. See, e.g., Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (holding that federal common
law applies to diversity actions), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64

(1938).
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that explicitly allowed both for the creation of federal courts and for the
exercise of federal diversity jurisdiction. 0 As Chief Justice Marshall
would explain two decades later, the Framers clearly intended diversity
jurisdiction to shield non-residents from actual or perceived local
prejudice:
However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states
will administer justice as impartially as those of the nation, to
parties of every description, it is not less true that the
constitution itself either entertains apprehensions on this
subject, or views with such indulgence the possible fears and
apprehensions of suitors, that it has established national
tribunals for the decision of controversies between aliens and a
citizen, or between citizens of different states.61
The open question became how federal courts would exercise the
diversity jurisdiction authorized by the Constitution.
B.

The JudiciaryAct of 1789 Authorizes Removal

Article III of the Constitution was not self-executing. Thus, in 1789,
the First Congress immediately turned to the creation of a federal
judiciary and to the provision of jurisdiction for that judiciary.2 As
scholars and historians have noted, this project was hardly a mechanical
exercise to implement a shared understanding of Article III. 61 Instead,
Federalists and Anti-Federalists renewed their contest over the
appropriate size, function, and jurisdiction of the federal courts.64 In the
end, the Judiciary Act of 1789 was the result of a compromise. AntiFederalists acquiesced to the creation of those same lower federal courts
that Patrick Henry warned would lead to the annihilation of state
courts. 65 On the other hand, by agreeing to strict limits on the
60. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1,2.
61. Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809). See also
Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 354 (1855) (stating that the purpose of diversity
jurisdiction is "to make the people think and feel, though residing in different States of the
Union, that their relations to each other were protected by the strictest justice,
administered in courts independent of all local control or connection with the subjectmatter of the controversy between the parties to a suit").
62. For the history of the Judiciary Act of 1789, see Charles Warren, New Light on
the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1923). See also
STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC McKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 62-64 (1993);
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 2, at 2-14; Holt, supra note 52; Robert N. Clinton,
A Mandatory View of FederalCourt Jurisdiction:Early Implementation of and Departures
from the ConstitutionalPlan, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1515 (1986).
63. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 62, at 123 (summarizing debates).
64. See id.
65. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.

2004]

Removing the Bias Against Removal

jurisdiction of lower federal courts, Federalists implicitly conceded that
the Constitution did not require those courts to exercise the full
jurisdictional grant set forth in Article III. 66 Thus, as Professor Charles
Warren has noted:
[T~he final form of the Act and its subsequent history cannot be
properly understood, unless it is realized that it was a
compromise measure, so framed as to secure the votes of those
who, while willing to see the experiment of a Federal
Constitution tried, were insistent that the Federal courts should
be given the minimum powers and jurisdiction.67
The Judiciary Act of 1789 limited the jurisdiction of inferior federal
circuit and district courts to certain narrowly defined categories."8 The
Act afforded
circuit courts diversity jurisdiction, albeit with some
•
S•
69
qualifications.
Specifically, federal courts were vested with original
jurisdiction over diversity cases when more than $500 was in dispute and
when one of the parties resided in the forum.71 Like the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention, the members of the First Congress intended
diversity jurisdiction to address the potential problem of local prejudice. 7,
The First Congress also faced a practical problem: federal courts
cannot meaningfully protect against local prejudice if a plaintiff simply
can avoid a federal forum by filing his lawsuit in state court. In other
words, from a defendant's perspective, the theoretical existence of
diversity jurisdiction is meaningless unless a procedural mechanism
allows a defendant to invoke its power over that lawsuit. Section 12 of
the Judiciary Act established this mechanism by authorizing removal to
federal court of any suit "commenced in any state court against an alien,
or by a citizen of the state in which suit is brought against a citizen of
another state, and [where] the matter in dispute exceeds the aforesaid
sum or value of five hundred dollars, exclusive of costs ....
Unfortunately, scant evidence exists regarding the drafting of section 12.
We know that the original Draft Bill of the Judiciary Act of 1789 allowed
for the removal of any action satisfying the requirements of diversity

66. See Warren, supra note 62, at 67 (discussing the position of the "broad proConstitution men" regarding the extent of federal jurisdiction).
67. See id. at 53.
68. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9, 11, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77, 78-79.
69. See id. § 11, 1 Stat. at 78.
70. See id.
71. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 62, at 83 (asserting that there is "not a trace of any
other purpose").
72. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79-80. The Act also allowed the
removal of certain disputes concerning title to land. Id. § 12, 1 Stat. at 80.
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jurisdiction.73 However, at some time prior to its adoption, the Senate
amended the language to provide the availability of removal only where
the plaintiff brought suit in his own state against an out-of-state
defendant.74 This restriction remains consistent with the notion that the
original intent of removal was to address cases in which a defendant
might face local prejudice in a state court.
Despite the lack of legislative history regarding the drafting of section
12, Justice Story's opinion in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee provides evidence
that the federal courts soon accepted that Congress created removal as a
procedural vehicle to implement diversity jurisdiction and to level the
playing field between plaintiffs and defendants:
The constitution of the United States was designed for the
common and equal benefit of all the people of the United
States. The judicial power was granted for the same benign and
salutary purposes. It was not to be exercised exclusively for the
benefit of parties who might be plaintiffs, and would elect the
national forum, but also for the protection of defendants who
might be entitled to try their rights, or assert their privileges,
before the same forum."
Indeed, allowing a plaintiff to "always elect the state court" would render
the protection afforded by diversity jurisdiction ineffective for a
defendant and "[s]uch a state of things can, in no respect, be considered
as giving equal rights., 76 Congress therefore authorized removal so that a
defendant would not be "deprived of all the security which the
constitution intended in aid of his rights."77 Thus, Justice Story's opinion
views removal as a procedural device intrinsically necessary for the
protection of a defendant's equal and constitutional right to litigate
certain claims in federal court.
Justice Story was not alone in this view. Rather, for roughly a century
after Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, most federal courts treated removal as a
necessary procedural mechanism affording defendants an equal
opportunity with plaintiffs to select a federal forum?' Removal merely
provided "an indirect mode" for a federal court to exercise diversity
jurisdiction, 9 thereby implementing the Constitution's vision of federal
jurisdiction.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See Warren, supra note 62, at 90-91.
See id. at 91.
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304, 348 (1816).
Id. at 348, 349.
Id. at 349.
See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
Railway Co. v. Whitton, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270,287 (1871). The Court stated:
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This is not to suggest that federal courts ignored the requirements of
the removal statutes. But when applying those statutes, courts focused
on fundamental questions of jurisdiction, not procedural nicetiessubstance, not form."" A case not falling within the terms of the removal
statute would be remanded. 8' Conversely, where a case's facts implicated
the federal courts' jurisdiction, technical matters would not defeat
removal. For example, in Gordon v. Longest, the United States Supreme
Court held that a state court reviewing a facially valid removal petition2
lacks discretion to deprive a defendant of the right to a federal forum .
Instead, the opportunity for a federal forum was equally available to
both plaintiffs and defendants:
One great object in the establishment of the Courts of the
United States and regulating their jurisdiction was, to have a
tribunal in each state, presumed to be free from local influence,
and to which all who were non-residents or aliens might resort
for legal redress. But this object would be defeated, if a state
judge, in the exercise of his discretion, may deny, to the party
entitled to it a removal of his cause. 83
In other words, judges could not presume to deprive a defendant of the
right to a federal forum. The Constitution treated this right as no less
important than the right of the plaintiff to select the initial forum."'
Although the federal courts protected a defendant's access to a federal
forum, Congress occasionally expanded the range of cases to which
The protection intended against [local prejudice] to non-residents of a State was
originally supposed to have been sufficiently secured by giving to the plaintiff in
the first instance an election of courts before suit brought; and where the suit was
commenced in a State court a like election to the defendant afterwards.
Id. at 289 (emphasis added).
80. See, e.g., infra notes 119-26 and accompanying text.
81. See Beardsley v. Torrey, 2 F. Cas. 1188, 1189 (Pa. D. 1822) (remanding case in
which all defendants did not join in removal, and stating that, "[t]he judiciary cannot
proceed upon grounds of expediency, but must execute the laws as they are found
written"); Smith v. Rines, 22 F. Cas. 639, 644 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1836) (requiring all
defendants to join in removal petition); but see Ward v. Arredondo, 29 F. Cas. 167, 169
(D.N.Y. 1825) (stating that although all defendants must consent to removal, they need
not join in initial removal petition when they are served at different times).
82. Gordon v. Longest, 41 U.S. 97, 104 (1842).
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U.S. 10, 19 (1875) (protecting against local
prejudice is provided by allowing the plaintiff to bring a diversity action in federal court
and providing "a like election to the defendant"); Case of Sewing Machine Cos., 85 U.S.
553, 573-74 (1873) (finding that the removal privilege is given to defendant in diversity
case, "as the plaintiff, when he institutes his suit, may elect in which of the two concurrent
jurisdictions he prefers to go to trial"); Kanouse v. Martin, 56 U.S. 198, 209 (1853) (noting
defendant's "right" and "privilege" of removal cannot be abridged by state court actions
subsequent to filing of a facially valid removal petition).
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removal applied. During the War of 1812, for example, a temporary act
was passed allowing removal of actions against customs officers, military
personnel, or other federal officials. 5 Subsequently, the Force Act of
1833 allowed
for the removal of cases against United States revenue
officers.866
The period between the ratification of the Constitution and the end of
the Civil War thus established removal as a simple procedural
mechanism that allowed all citizens equal access to the federal judiciary.
Removal ensured that plaintiffs would not have a monopoly on federal
jurisdiction. Prior to the Civil War, neither Congress nor the federal
courts treated removal as a pernicious or dangerous device that needed
restraint. To the contrary, federal courts interpreted removal statutes
liberally, while Congress authorized the expanded use of removal for
special cases. 7 Thus, as the U.S. Supreme Court later remarked, removal

"was exercised almost contemporaneously with the adoption of the
9
Constitution, and the power has been in constant use ever since.,
C. The Reconstruction Experiment with Expanded Removal

The first significant changes to removal practices occurred during and
immediately following the Civil War. Congress extended both the
original and the removal jurisdiction of the federal courts in an effort to
expand the reach of the federal judiciary to protect federal officers and
freed former slaves."" More generally, the growth of federal jurisdiction
was a natural corollary to the increased power of the national
government that resulted from the Confederacy's defeat in the war.""
With respect to removal, the process began with the Act of March 3,
1863 that allowed for the removal of cases brought against United States
officials for actions taken in their official capacity during the Civil War.9'

85. Act of Feb. 4, 1815, ch. 31, § 8, 3 Stat. 195, 198; Act of Mar. 3, 1815, ch. 94, § 6, 3
Stat. 231 (expired April 1815).
86. Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 3, 4 Stat. 632; see also JOHN F. DILLON, REMOVAL
OF CAUSES FROM STATE COURTS TO FEDERAL COURTS 5 (5th ed. 1889) (discussing the

Force Act); Gay v. Ruff, 292 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1934) (same).
87.

See DILLON, supra note 86, at 2, 5.

88. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 265 (1880); see also Gaines, 92 U.S. at 18 ("The
validity of this [removal] legislation is not open to serious question, and the provisions
adopted have been recognized and followed with scarcely an exception by the Federal and
State courts since the establishment of the government.").
89. For general background concerning federal procedure during the reconstruction
period, see FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 2, at 56-69, and STANLEY I. KUTLER,
JUDICIAL POWER AND RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS (1968).
90. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 2, at 56-69.

91.

Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, § 5, 12 Stat. 755, 756.
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It was followed by enactment of the Separable Controversy Act of 186692
and the Prejudice of Local Influence Act of 1867,"' two statutes that
further expanded the list of removable cases. The process culminated in
The Removal Act of 1875, a law that not only vested lower federal courts
with original federal question jurisdiction for the first time, but also
effected fundamental changes to the removal statute: (1) it expanded the
circuit court's removal power to include cases involving the newly
conferred federal question jurisdiction; (2) it allowed plaintiffs, as well as
defendants, to effect removal; (3) it allowed removal of an entire lawsuit
containing any "controversy" between citizens of different states; and (4)
it explicitly provided for the appellate review of remand orders. 9
In interpreting the removal statutes as amended by these acts, federal
courts continued to reflect Justice Story's view that removal was a
procedural mechanism intended to ensure that plaintiffs and defendants
had equal opportunities to invoke the original jurisdiction of the• federal
95
courts, which now included matters involving federal questions.
In
keeping with the remedial purpose of removal statutes, courts often
excused defects in technical matters of removal procedure, even when
those defeats went to matters arguably determinative of federal
96
jurisdiction. This is demonstrated by a federal court's explanation of its
decision allowing a defendant to amend a removal petition to add
jurisdictional allegations. 97
The court stated that there was no reasonable basis for distinguishing
between cases filed in federal court and those removed to federal court,
"nor any reason for holding a more rigid rule as to jurisdiction in removal
causes than others." 9 Rather, because a plaintiff in federal court could
amend his complaint to establish jurisdiction, the defendant should
92. Act of July 27,1866, ch. 288, 14 Stat. 306 (amended 1867).
93. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 288, 14 Stat. 558.
94. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470, 471: see generally FRANKFURTER &
LANDIS, supra note 2, at 64-69; Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 204
(1877) ("The act of 1875 has made some radical changes in the law regulating removals.").
95. See, e.g., Deford, Hinkle & Co. v. Mehaffy, 13 F. 481 (W.D. Tenn. 1882).
96. See, e.g., Ayers v. Watson, 113 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1885) (stating that the time limit
on removal could be waived by the plaintiff because "it is not, in its nature, a jurisdictional
matter, but a mere rule of limitation"); Removal Cases, 100 U.S. 457, 478 (1879)
(unverified petition excused); Ins. Co. v. Dunn, 86 U.S. 214, 224 (1873) ("The [removal]
statute is remedial, and must be construed liberally."); Harris v. Delaware & L. & W. R.
Co., 18 F. 833, 836 (D. N.J. 1884) (finding that neither a "perfect" petition nor a bond is
required for removal; such matters are only matters of practice, not jurisdictional

requirements).
97. Deford, 13 F. at 487.
98. Id.; see also Bondurant v. Watson, 103 U.S. 281, 287 (1880) (stating that there is
no reason "why a party to such a controversy should not enjoy his constitutional right of
having his case tried by a court of the United States").

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 53:609

receive a similar opportunity for his removal petition.99 The court further
explained:
[Ilt is a refinement of delicacy to hold that the merely directory
provisions regulating the mode of procedure are so rigid in their
character that they become jurisdictional, are beyond
correction, and fatal to the jurisdiction if defective. This theory
can only be sustained on the notion that there is something
extraordinary in this proceeding-so much so that it is to be
discouraged and not favored by the courts, as something that is
harsh and out of the ordinary course of remedial rights. I do
not so regard it.""
A federal court could not convert mere rules of practice into
preconditions for the exercise of federal jurisdiction.""
Expanded removal opportunities and the creation of federal question
jurisdiction greatly increased the reach of the federal courts." 2 At the
same time, commercial development following the Civil War increased
the volume of litigation."3 This combination resulted in exploding
federal dockets. As one commentator noted in 1889, "the small tide of
litigation that formerly flowed in federal channels has swollen into a
mighty stream.. ' ..
Not everyone welcomed this development. Many considered federal
courts as the friend of creditors and the bane of debtors." Indeed,
Eastern corporate interests undoubtedly sought to avoid inconsistent
state law and unfriendly state judicial systems by litigating in the less
hostile and more predictable federal courts.""" Moreover, by removing a
case to a sometimes distant federal courthouse, corporate defendants
obtained a tactical advantage over individual plaintiffs who could not
afford the travel or litigation expense.107
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Deford, 13 F. at 487.
Id. at 490-91.
Id. at 491.
See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 2, at 60.
Id.
104. DILLON, supra note 86, at 2-3. A further impetus to the expansion of federal
jurisdiction was the Supreme Court's holding that every lawsuit by or against a federally
chartered corporation implicates federal question jurisdiction. See Pacific R.R. Removal
Cases, 115 U.S. 1, 11 (1885).
105. See, e.g., RUSSELL R. WHEELER & CYNTHIA HARRISON, CREATING THE
FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 18 (2d ed. 1994) (noting that some critics believed, "not
without some evidence, that the federal courts were too sympathetic to commercial
interests, too eager to frustrate state legislative efforts designed to help farmers and
workers").
106. See generally Rhonda Wasserman, Rethinking Review of Remands: Proposed
Amendments To The FederalRemoval Statute, 43 EMORY L.J. 83, 94-97 (1994).
107. See id.
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The inevitable reaction was criticism of expanding federal
jurisdiction."" Although some argued that the problem required an
expansion of the federal judiciary to deal with the new glut of litigation, a
more common reaction was to press for a curtailment of all federal
In fact, several
jurisdiction, including removal jurisdiction."'9
unsuccessful attempts quickly were made to retreat from the expansive
grant of removal jurisdiction conferred by the 1875 Removal Act.'"'
D. The Experiment Abandoned: The Act of 1887 Returns Removal to Its
Pre-CivilWar Status
In 1887, twelve years after greatly expanding federal jurisdiction with
the Removal Act of 1875, Congress largely reversed the experiment."'
The Judiciary Act of 1887 (as corrected in 1888) stripped all plaintiffs
and resident defendants in diversity actions of the ability to remove a
case to federal court-a statutory restriction that remains in place
today."2 Through this amendment, Congress largely restored the device
of removal to its original purpose of providing a procedural vehicle for
defendants to litigate a case implicating the original jurisdiction of
federal court. Congress also raised the monetary threshold for all federal
jurisdiction cases to $2,000." 3 Notably, however, Congress did not
prohibit the removal of federal question cases.'"4 Thus, although more
restrictive than the Act of 1875, the Act of 1887 allowed for the removal
of a greater variety and number of cases than did the Judiciary Act of
1789.

108.
109.
110.
111.
1888, 25
112.
113.
114.

See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 2, at 83-86.
See id. at 83-84.
See id. at 89.
Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 552, 553 (as corrected by Act of Aug. 13,
Stat. 433).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Contemporary courts 5 and commentators' 6 recognized that the
purpose of the 1887 amendments was to limit removal. Also at this time,
the notion of strictly construing removal first crept into federal case
law." 7 This strict construction, however, would apply only to the
additional limitations placed upon removal by the 1887 Act.I, As such,
federal courts did not suggest that the original requirements for removal
contained in the Judiciary Act of 1789 should require more strict
application as a result of the 1887 amendments.
In applying the revised statutes, federal courts were careful not to
overstate the case for limiting removal. Through the 1887 amendments,
Congress may have reversed, in part, recent legislation allowing
increased use of removal, but it had not altered the basic premise that
defendants and plaintiffs possess an equal constitutional right to a federal
forum." 9 Nor did the 1887 revisions to the removal statutes suggest that
the courts could erect new and additional hurdles not found in the text of
the recent amendments themselves." Instead, removal simply had been
restored to the status it enjoyed under the Judiciary Act of 1789."

115. See Smith v. Lyon, 133 U.S. 315, 319 (1890) (noting that the evident purpose of
the 1887 Act was "to restrict rather than to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts");
Woolf v. Chisolm, 30 F. 881, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1887) ("It was the obvious purpose of the Act
of March 3, 1887, to restrict the right of removal of an action from a state court to the
circuit court, as it then existed."); Dwyer v. Peshall, 32 F. 497, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1887) ("The
amendments of 1887 were plainly meant to restrict removals from state to federal
courts.").
116. See, e.g., DILLON, supra note 86, at 3. These commentators asserted:
[The Act's] apparent design is to stem the tide of litigation pouring into the
Federal courts, to bar out a considerable portion of the cases which had hitherto
found their way into those tribunals, to restrict the right of removing causes
within much narrower limits than it had filled under the law of 1875, and to
discourage litigants from seeking this resort in the cases where it is still allowed.
Id.
117. E.g., Dwyer, 32 F. at 498 (noting that the new removal statute "should be strictly
construed against any one seeking to evade the additionallimitations which it puts upon
the right of removal.") (emphasis added).
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., Arrowsmith v. Nashville & D.R. Co., 57 F. 165, 170 (N.D. Tenn. 1893)
("The right to remove is a constitutional right .... ).
120. Cf Lee v. Chesapeake & Oh. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 653,660 (1923). The Court held:
We recognize that one purpose of the act of 1888 was to contract the jurisdiction
of the Circuit Courts and that due regard should be had for this in interpreting
indefinite or ambiguous provisions; but we think it affords no basis for
subtracting anything from provisions which are definite and free from ambiguity.
Id.
121. Cf. DILLON, supra note 86, at 23 (stating that the intent of the Act was "to return
to the earlier standards, and fix[] the lines of jurisdiction at points very similar to those
established by the Judiciary Act [of 1789]").
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An example of the prevailing attitude towards removal in the late22
v. Cody.'
nineteenth century is provided by Texas & Pacific Railway Co.
In that 1897 decision, the U.S..Supreme Court held that the defendant
could remove even where the plaintiff's complaint mistakenly alleged
that the parties were not diverse.' 23 To allow the plaintiff to profit from
such an inaccurate allegation would "cut off defendant's constitutional
right as a citizen of a different state than the plaintiff,, to choose a federal
,,24 In a similar vein, the Supreme Court held in Powers v.
forum .
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. that the time for filing a removal
petition is not jurisdictional, but merely "modal and formal.' 25 Thus,
federal courts continued to apply removal procedures in a way that
prevail over the actual-or follow the letter
would not "let the nominal
2
rather than the spirit.'
Moving into the twentieth century, the decision by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co.,' 21 illustrates that, as late as
1923, federal courts remained cognizant of the need to avoid defeating a
defendant's removal right by unduly strict construction of removal
statutes. 2 In that case, the plaintiff sought to defeat the removal on the
grounds that the statutory venue rules in place at the time precluded the
defendant from removing to the federal court of a district in which
neither party resided.12 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected this argument,
finding that the right of removal could not be abridged beyond
restrictions explicitly found in the text of the amended statutes:
[Wihile the comparison [between the removal acts of 1875 and
1888] shows that Congress intended to contract materially the
jurisdiction on removal, it also shows how the contraction was
to be effected. Certainly there is nothing in this which suggests
that the plain terms in the act of 1888-by which it declared that
any suit "between citizens of different states" brought in any
state court and involving the requisite amount, "may be
removed by the defendant or defendants" where they are "nonresidents of that State"-should be taken otherwise than
according to their natural or ordinary signification.'""
122. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cody, 166 U.S. 606 (1897).
123. Id. at 610-11.
124. Id. at 609 (emphasis added).
125. 169 U.S. 92, 99 (1898).
126. San Antonio Sub. Irrigated Farms v. Shandy, 29 F.2d 579, 581 (D. Kan. 1928)
(holding that a counterclaim-defendant may remove action although he was not regarded
as a "defendant" under state law).
127. 260 U.S. 653 (1923).
128. Id. at 660.
129. Id. at 654.
130. Id. at 660-61 (emphasis added).
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Moreover, the Court noted that although the Act of 1887 was narrower
than the Act of 1875, it was, in fact, broader than the removal provision
of the original Judiciary Act of 1789.' Although a different result would
"materially relieve the overburdened dockets of the District Courts,"
only Congress-not the courts-could impose further limits on
removal.'32
Overall, federal courts, including the United States Supreme Court,
did not view the post-Civil War adjustments to removal statutes as
fundamentally altering the nature of the device. 3 3 Courts continued to
recognize a defendant's equal and constitutional right to a federal
forum." 4 On the whole, they also continued to interpret the removal
statutes, like other remedial statutes, liberally. ' The one caveat was that
the particular restrictions imposed by the 1887 Act were strictly
construed so as to return removal to its original roots.' 36 The
amendments of 1887 and 1888 thus returned removal practice to its prior
position under the Judiciary Act of 1789; the amendments did
3 7 not
authorize further judicially constructed restrictions upon removal.'
E. Twentieth Century FederalCourts Stigmatize Removal
1. A Split Emerges Over Whether to Favor Removal or Remand
Federal removal statutes remained relatively unchanged from the Act
of 1887 until the conclusion of the Second World War. Although
Congress reorganized the removal statute in 1911,' 31 few substantive
changes were made at that time impacting removal jurisdiction. 9
Instead, removal jurisdiction generally remained available in four classes
of cases: (1) federal question; (2) diversity or alienage; (3) separable
131. Id. at 661.
132. Id.; see also Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Sheegog, 215 U.S. 308, 330 (1909) (Day, J.,
dissenting) (finding that "the Courts of the United States should not interfere with the
jurisdiction of the state courts in cases properly within the same, and the Federal courts
should be equally vigilant to defeat all fraudulent devices or attempts to avoid the
jurisdiction of the Federal courts"); Cochran v. Montgomery County, 199 U.S. 260, 273
(1905) (indicating that although the purpose of 1887 Amendment was to restrict removal,
"this was largely accomplished in the matter of removals by withholding the right from
plaintiffs").
133. See, e.g., Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co., 166 U.S. 606, 609 (1897).
134. Id.
135. See Ayers v. Watson, 113 U.S. 594 (1885); Ins. Co. v. Dunn, 86 U.S. 214 (1872).
136. See Dwyer v. Peshall, 32 F. 497, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1887).
137. See id.
138. See JUD. CODE § 28 (1911)28 U.S.C. § 71(1940).
139. See 16 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 107 App. 100[2] (3d ed. 2003)
[hereinafter MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE].
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The procedures used by
controversy; and (4) local prejudice.' 4'
defendants to invoke4 removal jurisdiction also remained largely
'
unchanged until 1948.'
Nevertheless, while the removal statutes themselves did not greatly
change in the first half of the twentieth century, judicial attitudes towards
.•142
those statutes underwent a transformation that was subtle yet radical.
Gradually, almost imperceptibly, federal courts stopped treating removal
as a procedural device that protected a defendant's equal and
constitutionally-based right to a federal forum. 143 Instead, in the eyes of
many federal judges, removal degenerated into a procedural anomaly
a plaintiff of his superior "right" to select the forum of his
that deprived
144
choice.

The seeds of this doctrinal shift lay in a seemingly innocuous 1886
decision by a federal Circuit Court. In Kessinger v. Vannatta, 45 the court
ruled that a defendant saloon owner could not remove a nuisance action
despite his contention that the attachment of his business would deprive
him of his property without due process of law. 46 In rendering its
decision, the court stated that if it remanded the case, the defendant
could appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. 47 Therefore, the court deemed
course" to remand, given that federal jurisdiction was
it the "wiser
4
doubtful.
Five years later, a district court in Nebraska considered this
proposition in greater detail in Fitzgerald v. Missouri Pacific Railway.
Co. 149 In that case, the court expressly rejected the defendant's argument

that doubtful cases should be decided in favor of removal."" Instead,
relying heavily on Kessinger, the court stressed the supposed inefficiency
The court
of retaining federal jurisdiction in questionable cases.'
presumed remand was appropriate in such instances because "[t]he
benefit of a reasonable doubt should never be given to a practice that
protects and fosters litigation and multiplies costs."'' 2

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See 28 U.S.C. § 71 (1940).
See 16 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 139, at § 107 App. 100[t] [2].
See, e.g., Kessinger v. Vannatta, 27 F. 890 (S.D. Iowa 1886).
See id.
See Fitzgerald v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 45 F. 812 (D. Neb. 1891).
Kessinger, 27 F. at 890.

146.

Id.at 891.

147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id.
45 F. 812 (D. Neb. 1891).

150.

Id. at 819-21.

151.
152.

Id. at 821.
Id.
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Subsequently, other federal courts also have held for remand of cases
of doubtful federal jurisdiction.' 53 This prudential rule largely was based
on practical considerations rather than federalism or a plaintiff's superior
right to select a forum.' 54 As one court summarized the emerging view:
"It is the safer and wiser course to send a cause for trial to a court of
unquestionable jurisdiction, rather than retain it here, and go through all
the forms of trial when the jurisdiction is doubtful."'55 In other words,
these courts believed that a rule favoring remand would prove
administratively efficient and would avoid the imposition of unnecessary
costs upon both courts and litigants. 56
Not all federal courts accepted this logic. The Eighth Circuit, for
example, offered a particularly powerful rejoinder in Boatmen's Bank of
St. Louis v. Fritzen.5 7 In the course of determining whether separable
controversies existed to support removal, the court held that
presumptions .against removal were improper, and therefore rejected
both Kessinger and Fitzgerald." First, the Court noted that Kessinger
was decided before Congress revoked the right to appeal a remand
decision.'5"9 Under the statutory framework as it existed at the time of
Kessinger, a decision remanding a case was immediately reviewable, but
a decision denying remand could only be reviewed on appeal at the end
of the case.'"
By the time of Boatmen's, however, the situation
effectively had been reversed.16 Thus, the Boatmen's court correctly
observed that "a party who is deprived of his right to the trial of a

153. See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 201 F. 932, 945 (E.D.
Tenn. 1912) (stating "if there be any substantial doubt as to Federal jurisdiction the cause
should be remanded, and jurisdiction retained only where it is clear."); Shane v. Buttle
Elec. Ry. Co., 150 F. 801, 812 (D. Mon. 1906) (stating that "the statutes of removal should
be construed not in a way to authorize the exercise of jurisdiction where the question is
doubtful ....
");
Heller v. llwaco Mill & Lumber Co., 178 F. 111, 112 (D. Or. 1910) (stating
that the 1887 Amendment "was designed to contract the jurisdiction of the federal courts,
and the tendency is to construe it strictly against the right of removal"); Concord Coal Co.
v. Haley, 76 F. 882, 882 (D.N.H. 1896) ("Cases in which our jurisdiction is in doubt should
be remanded to the court from which they are removed.").
154. See, e.g., Shane, 150 F. at 812; Western Union, 201 F. at 945. See also Concord
Coal, 76 F. at 882 (stating that the rule "results naturally" from a judicial system where
state courts decide the extent of individual rights).
155. Shane, 150 F. at 812 (quoting Fitzgerald v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 45 F.,812 (D. Neb.
1891)).
156. See id.
157. 135 F. 650 (8th Cir. 1905).
158. Id. at 653-54.
159. Id. at 653.

166. id.
161.

Id. at 653-54.
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controversy in the federal court by an erroneous62order which remands it
to a court of a state is now left without remedy.'
Echoing the views of Justice Story and other nineteenth century jurists,
the Eighth Circuit also stressed that the right of removal "is of sufficient
value and gravity to be guarantied by the Constitution and the acts of
Congress.' 6'
This constitutionally-based right, the court concluded,
could not simply be ignored by federal courts seeking a more efficient
decision-making process:
No sound reason occurs why those whose oaths and duty
require them to enforce this Constitution and these laws, and to
sustain and give effect to this valuable and important right,
should resolve every doubt against the enforcement of the
Constitution and the Acts of Congress, and against the
protection and exercise of the right.
Accordingly, as the Boatmen's court 16 and others following its holding
recognized, '66 removal is a valuable constitutional right, and because a
defendant has no effective appeal from a remand order, no presumption
against removal should exist. Furthermore, even those courts that did
not expressly adopt Boatmen's nevertheless struck a middle
position that
67
fell short of a strong presumption in favor of remand.

162. Id. at 653 (quoting Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 160 U.S. 556, 581-82 (1896)).
163. Id. at 655 (emphasis added); see, e.g., Bley v. Travelers Ins. Co., 27 F. Supp. 351,
357 (S.D. Ala. 1939) (stating that the removal right is both constitutional and statutory);
Houlton Sav. Bank v. Am. Laundry Mach. Co., 7 F. Supp. 858, 862 (D. Me. 1934); Taylor
v. Scarborough, 56 F.2d 281, 282 (E.D.N.Y.1932); McMillen v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am.,
8 F.2d 881, 883 (W.D. Mo. 1925); Todd v. S.A. Healy Co., 49 F. Supp. 584, 587 (E.D. Ky.
1943).
164. Boatmen's Bank of St. Louis v. Fritzen, 135 F. 650, 654 (8th Cir. 1905).
165. See Farmers' Bank & Trust Co. of Hardinsburg, Ky. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.
Co., 25 F.2d 23, 31 (8th Cir. 1928) (following Boatmen's).
166. See Bley, 27 F. Supp. at 358 (following Boatmen's and noting that removal is a
right provided "by the Constitution and the acts of Congress"); Houlton Say. Bank, 7 F.
Supp. at 863 (denying remand and stating: "If I am wrong, the error can be corrected");
Bon v. Midwest Refining Co., 30 F.2d 410, 413 (D. Wy. 1929) (following Boatmen's);
McLaughlin v. W. Union Tel. Co., 7 F.2d 177, 184 (E.D. La. 1925) ("Where removability is
doubtful, the court should not remand, because there is no relief by appeal from an order
remanding."); Niccum v. N. Assoc. Co., 17 F.2d 160, 164 (D. Ind. 1927) (holding that
doubts should be resolved in favor of removal); Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Kay, 107 F.
Supp. 895, 906 (S.D. Iowa 1952) (finding itself "strongly persuaded" by Boatmen's);
Drainage Dist. No. 19, Caldwell County v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 198 F. 253, 264
(D. Mo. 1912) (re-affirming presumption in favor of removal).
167. See, e.g, Smith v. Gilliam, 282 F. 628, 633 (W.D. Ky. 1922) (finding the court
should order remand unless it is "fairly clear" that removal was proper); Eddy v. Chi. &
N.W.Ry. Co., 226 F. 120, 125-26 (D. Wis. 1915) (quoting Boatmen's and stating that "[t]he
presumption against . . .[removal] jurisdiction is not to be carried to an unreasonable
extent").
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Shamrock Oil Establishesthe Disfavored Status of Removal

This uneasy tension in the federal courts continued throughout the first
few decades of the twentieth century.'68 An opportunity to resolve the
split finally presented itself in Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets.6 9 In
Shamrock Oil, the specific question before the Court was whether a
plaintiff could remove a counterclaim.'" Turning to the history of federal
removal practice, the Court noted that the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not
allow for such removal. 7 ' Although the 1875 Act permitted plaintiffs to
remove, that right was taken away by the Act of 1887."2 The Court held
that this indicated congressional intent to "narrow the federal jurisdiction
on removal by reviving in substance the provisions of § 12 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 ....
Accordingly, it would be inconsistent with
congressional intent to allow removal to occur under circumstances
74
where it had not been available under the Judiciary Act of 1789.1
The Supreme Court could have ended its review there, but it chose not
to do so. Turning to questions of policy, the Court ironically avoided
any discussion of the split in the federal courts over whether judicial
efficiency was promoted by a rule favoring remand. Instead, Shamrock
Oil announced two new policy reasons to limit removal.' 5 First, the
Court perceived a general post-1887 congressional hostility toward
expanded federal jurisdiction, noting that "[n]ot only does the language
of the Act of 1887 evidence the Congressional purpose to restrict the
jurisdiction of the federal courts on removal, but the policy of the
successive acts of Congress regulating the jurisdiction of federal courts is
one callingfor the strict construction of such legislation.'', 76 Thus, removal
jurisdiction was restricted not only because of congressional intent in the
Act of 1887, but also because of what was perceived as a more general
congressional hostility to all "jurisdiction of federal courts.' 77 In other
words, strict construction of removal statutes could serve as a proxy for
generally limiting federal jurisdiction.
168. The Supreme Court did not address the split until over thirty-five years after
Boatmen's. See generally Boatmen's, 135 F. at 650; Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets,
313 U.S. 100 (1941).
169. Shamrock Oil, 313 U.S. at 100.
170. Id. at 103.
171. Id. at 105-06.
172. Id. at 106.
173. Id. at 107.
174. Id.; cf supra note 121 (noting authority contemporaneous with the Act of 1887
that suggested that the purpose of the Act was to restore removal to its position under the
Judiciary Act of 1789).
175. Shamrock Oil, 313 U.S. at 108-09.
176. Id. at 108 (emphasis added).
177. Id.
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Furthermore, quoting from the language of an earlier decision
discussing federal question jurisdiction, the Court continued: "Due
regard for the rightful independence of state governments, which should
actuate federal courts, requires that they scrupulously confine their own
defined.' ', 78
jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has
Although this language probably was intended merely as a restatement
of the general principle that federal courts, as courts of limited
jurisdiction, should proceed cautiously when interpreting their own
jurisdiction, 79 later courts would cite Shamrock Oil for the proposition
that removal directly threatens the federal system of government created
by the Constitution.
Consequently, Shamrock Oil established three separate grounds for
limiting removal: (1) congressional intent gleaned from the 1887
amendment to restore removal practice to its former limits under the
Judiciary Act of 1789;"' (2) congressional measures post-1887 on matters
other than removal suggested that Congress favored a curtailment of
federal jurisdiction; 12 and (3) removal jurisdiction, like all federal
jurisdiction, should be construed narrowly to protect the dignity of state
courts."13 Notably, the Court neither discussed the relative importance of
these various factors nor provided a framework for dealing with cases in
which different policies might suggest alternative results. For example,
in interpreting an ambiguous removal statute, would federalism and
respect for a supposedly general congressional hostility toward federal
jurisdiction require the remand of a case which, under the Judiciary Act
of 1789, could have been removed to the federal courts? Is it permissible
or desirable for federal courts to tilt the litigation playing field in favor of
plaintiffs for the ostensible purpose of preserving the dignity of state
courts?
As far as most federal courts were concerned, the answers to such
questions were clear. In subsequent years, federal courts (after dutifully
referencing federalism and the alleged congressional hostility toward all
federal jurisdiction) cited Shamrock Oil for the proposition that a
plaintiff's right to select a forum is more important than a defendant's

178. Id. at 109 (quoting Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263 (1934)).
179. See Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. 8 (1799) (noting the general presumption
against exercise of federal jurisdiction).
180. See, e.g., Maloan v. BancorpSouth Bank, Inc., No. 01-1366, 2002 WL 1397266, at
*3 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 29, 2002) (Shamrock Oil restricts removal "to protect the state courts
from usurpation by federal courts").
181. Shamrock Oil, 313 U.S. at 106-07 n.2.
182. Id. at 108-09.
183. Id. at 109.
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right to removal'A' Courts have also cited Shamrock Oil for the
proposition that all doubts must be resolved in favor of remand. 85
However, in reaching these conclusion, the courts ignored Shamrock
Oil's suggestion that Congress intended for the removal practice to
return to the position it occupied prior to the 1875 Reconstruction
Amendments. 86 In years that followed, additional federal courts would
lose sight of the fact that nothing in Shamrock Oil grants federal courts a
license to construct their own obstacles to removal. Nevertheless, from
this point forward, removal would face scrutiny far more stringent than
at any previous time.8 7 Justice Story's notion that removal was intended
to give defendants equal access to the federal courts quietly
disappeared.8 At the same time, removal became further restricted as
new judicially-created obstacles appeared.' 9
F.

The 1948 Judicial Code and Subsequent Amendments

Although the treatment of removal by the courts changed during the
twentieth century, Congress gave little indication that it either desired or
authorized a fundamental transformation of removal practice. To the
contrary, legislative action during the twentieth century simply evidences
a consistent congressional desire to make removal practice fair and
efficient. This is evidenced by amendments to the removal statutes
enacted in 1948, 1949, 1965, and 1988."
The modern statutory basis for federal removal procedure emerged
from the Judicial Code of 1948.' 9' Perhaps the most noteworthy point
184. See, e.g., Auchinleck v. Town of LaGrange, 167 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1069 (E.D. Wis.
2001) (citing Shamrock Oil for the proposition that "[t]he plaintiff's right to choose his
forum is superior to the defendant's right of removal"); see also In re World Trade Center
Disaster Site Litig., 270 F. Supp. 2d 357, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Shamrock Oil as
requiring strict construction to promote "the right of plaintiffs to choose the forum in
which to bring suit"); Harris Corp. v. Kollsman, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1150 (M.D. Fla.
2000) (finding that Shamrock Oil orders strict construction of removal statutes to uphold
"a plaintiff's right to choose its own forum").
185. See, e.g., Shadie v. Aventis Pasteur, Inc., 254 F. Supp. 2d 509, 514 (M.D. Pa. 2003);
Alessi v. Beracha, 244 F. Supp. 2d 354, 356 (D. Del. 2003); Curtin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. &
N.J., 183 F. Supp. 2d 664, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Vartanian v. Terzian, 960 F. Supp. 58, 61
(D.N.J. 1997); Univ. of Tenn. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar., 670 F. Supp. 1379, 1387 (E.D.
Tenn. 1987); Mountain Navigation Co., Inc. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union of N. Am., 348 F.
Supp. 1298, 1300 (W.D. Wis. 1971); Jerro v. Home Lines, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 670, 671
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
186. Shamrock Oil, 313 U.S. at 107.
187. See infra notes 230-32 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
189. See, e.g., infra notes 233-37 and accompanying text.
190. See infra footnotes 191-209 and accompanying text.
191. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 89, § 1441, 62 Stat. 937.
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about that statutory amendment concerns the timing of removal. Before
1948, a defendant could remove at any time prior to the due date of his
responsive pleading.' 9 No uniform removal time period existed because
the date for filing a responsive pleading varied from one jurisdiction to
another. Accordingly, Congress enacted language that required service
"within twenty days after commencement of the action or service of
process, whichever is later.' '

93

Congress intended that this measure

would provide a uniform removal standard.'9 4
After the enactment of the 1948 Judicial Code, it became necessary to
make a technical amendment to section 28.' 9' At that time, New York
and a handful of other states allowed an action to commence upon the
service of a summons unaccompanied by a complaint, meaning that the
removal period could run prior to the defendant's receipt of the
complaint. 96 Therefore, the statute was amended to provide that a
defendant's removal right was triggered by the receipt, "through service
or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading."'9'7 This amendment
merely demonstrates Congress's desire to ensure that removal
procedures remained uniform and fair.
This sentiment is further demonstrated by a 1965 amendment in which'
Congress extended the time for removal from twenty to thirty days. 9
The Committee Report accompanying the House Bill stated that "the
existing 20-day period for filing a petition for the removal of a civil action
from a State court to a federal court is too short to permit the removal of
many actions as to which valid grounds of removal exist."'
The
legislative history also cited concerns about situations where a delay
occurs due to a difficulty in obtaining local counsel.2 1 In short, Congress
was concerned that the twenty-day limit made it "impractical 2to remove
many cases over which federal jurisdiction could be exercised., '

A significant statutory amendment concerning removal occurred in
1988.22 At that time, Congress amended the removal statute to allow for
192. 28 U.S.C. § 72 (1940) (consolidated in 28 U.S.C. § 1446).
193. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 89, § 1446, 62 Stat. 939.
194. See Committee Note to 1948 Enactment of Removal Statutes, H.R. REP. No. 80308 at A135 (1948) (stating that revised section 1446 "will give adequate time and operate
uniformly throughout the Federal jurisdiction").
195. Id.
196. See Committee Note to 1949 Amendments to Sections 1446, 1447, and 1449, H.R.

REP. No. 80-352, § 83 (1949).
197. Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 83(b), 63 Stat. 101.
198. Act of Sept. 29, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-215, 79 Stat. 887 (1965).
199. See 16 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 139, at § 107App. 05[2].
200. Id.
201. See id.
202. Pub. L. No. 100-702 § 1016, 102 Stat. 4669 (1988).
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disregarding the citizenship of fictitious defendants for removal purposes,
to simplify the pleading requirements for removal, and to limit removal
in a diversity action to one year from the filing of the complaint.2' 3
Evidently the legislative history reflects a general congressional intent to
ensure that removal practice remained fair and efficient. 2" For example,
the Committee Note suggests that disregarding fictitious defendants for
removal purposes would eliminate potential problems, such as "great
uncertainty as to the time when removal becomes possible, premature
attempts to remove and litigation over removeability, and forfeiture of
the removal opportunity by delay after the point that in retrospect seems
to have made clear the right to remove., 2'"
Although the 1988
amendment also imposed a one-year time limit on the removal of
diversity actions, 2016this "modest curtailment" of removal jurisdiction was
directed to a discrete problem: situations in which a non-diverse
defendant would attempt to remove on the eve of trial and create
significant disruption.2 "
Congress simply was concerned with the
unfairness and inefficiency of last minute forum shopping.210
It should be clear from these examples that statutory amendments to
the removal statutes after the Second World War reflect a continuing
congressional desire for removal practice to remain fair, uniform, and
efficient. 2' There is no evidence that Congress intended to restrict
opportunities for removal by creating procedural landmines that would
favor plaintiffs at the expense of defendants.
1II.

THE REMOVAL LANDSCAPE TODAY

A.

The Statute

The statutory provisions governing removal are found in Title 28 of the
United States Code at Sections 1441 through 1452.2.. They appear
deceptively simple. First, Section 1441 provides the general jurisdictional
grounds for removing cases involving either a federal question or

203. Id. § 1016.
204. See infra Part I I.F.
205. 16 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 139, at § 107 App. 05[2].
Congress's intent for removal to remain fair and efficient also is demonstrated by the fact
that a "detailed pleading" for grounds of removal was not required. Additionally,
Congress viewed the requirement of bond for removal as an unnecessary "procedural
complication." Id.
206. See Act of Nov. 19,1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1016, 102 Stat. 4669.
207. See 16 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 139, at § 107App. 05[2].
208. Id.
209. See infra Part II.F.
210. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1452 (2000).
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diversity of citizenship."' Section 1441 allows for removal on grounds of
diversity jurisdiction only by a non-resident defendant."' Additional
statutory provisions authorize removal for specific categories of cases.
2 3
These categories include actions against federal officers or agencies,
suits against members of the armed forces, 214 civil rights cases, 215 and
foreclosure actions against the United States.2 6
The procedures governing removal jurisdiction are set forth in Sections
1446 through 1448.217 The defendant must file a removal notice stating
grounds for removal and attaching relevant pleadings and other
2181
documents from the state court action.
The complete notice must be
filed within thirty days of receipt of the summons and complaint. 2' 9 The
statute also provides that where a basis for removal is not apparent in the
initial pleading, but subsequently emerges, the defendant may remove
within thirty days after receipt of an amended pleading "or other paper
from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has
become removable .... ,22,, Nevertheless, as a result of the previously
discussed 1988 amendment, all cases predicated on diversity jurisdiction
must be removed within one year of the commencement of the action.
The statutes also cover such procedural matters as service of process,
222
joinder of parties, compiling the record, and moving for remand.
For
example, the statute expressly provides that an order remanding a case to
state court "is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise., 22 Additional
requirements governing removal procedure also are found in the Federal
Rules 22of Civil Procedure 224 and in the local rules of many federal district
courts. S

211. See § 1441(a) (removing cases "of which the district courts of the United States
have original jurisdiction").
212. Id. § 1441(b).
213. Id. § 1442.
214. Id. § 1442(a).
215. Id. § 1443.
216. Id. § 1444.
217. Id. §§ 1446-48.

218. Id. § 1446.
219. Id. § 1446(b).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See id. §§ 1447-49.
223. Id. § 1447(d).
224. See FED. R. Civ. P. 81(c) (governing such matters as the filing of an answer and
the demand for a jury trial in a removed action).
225. See, e.g., MD. U.S.D.C. 103.5 (D. Md.) (requiring the filing of an additional
certification for removed cases); U.S.D.C. D. DEL. L.R. 81.2 (D. Del.) (same); cf. Hayes v.
Bass Pro Outdoor World, L.L.C., No. 0269106, 2003 WL 187411 (N.D. III Jan. 21, 2003)
(remanding for failure to comply with local rule).
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CurrentJudicialAttitudes Toward Removal

An understanding of current removal practice requires a review not
only of the statute, but also of the caselaw. Indeed, a practitioner who
advises his client about removal issues solely based upon the language of
the statute should put his malpractice carrier on notice.
Despite
congressional desire for removal procedure to be uniform and fair,
227
26
removal law varies widely by circuit, by district within each circuit,
228
and, in some cases, by each judge within a particular district..
The result
is a procedural morass where even a careful litigator may unknowingly
step into a trap that prevents removal of a case that otherwise falls within
the reach of federal jurisdiction.
Although they disagree on many questions of removal practice, most
federal courts agree about the overall philosophy that applies to removal:
a defendant's right to remove must be limited wherever and whenever
possible. 2 9 Therefore, rarely does a decision concerning removal not
begin with some variation of the axiom dictating strict construction of
removal jurisdiction. This general rule also has led to several subsidiary
maxims that detail the burdens placed upon the removing defendant. To
begin, the removing defendant, as the party seeking to invoke the
authorityexisenc
of the federal... court, 230bears the burden of establishing the
offedeal

existence of federal jurisdiction.
The removing defendant also must
bear the additional burden of proving that he has complied with all
231
removal
procedures.
importantly,
if there
is any question
over
the existence
of federalMost
jurisdiction
or over
compliance
with removal

226. See, e.g., infra notes 334-45 and accompanying text (discussing the split among the
courts over the first-served defendant rule).
227. Compare Green Point Savings Bank v. Hidalgo, 910 F. Supp. 89, 92 (E.D.N.Y.
1995) (stating that the one-year limitation in 28 U.S.C. § 1446 is jurisdictional) with In re
Rezulin Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 00 Civ. 2843, 02 Civ. 6827, 2003 WL 21355201 at *3
(S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2003) (stating that the one-year bar is subject to equitable exceptions);
Freeman v. Bechtel, 936 F. Supp. 320, 326 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (stating that later-served
defendants may initiate removal even if earlier-served defendants failed to timely
remove); Beasley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 835 F. Supp. 269 (D.S.C. 1993)
(adopting opposite rule).
228. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Lott, 255 F. Supp. 2d 326 (D.N.J. 2003) (discussing the split
among judges in the District of New Jersey over calculation of amount in controversy for
purposes of removal).
229. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
230. Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co. 257 U.S. 92 (1921); Prize Frize, Inc. v. Matrix
(U.S.) Inc., 167 F.3d 1261,1265 (9th Cir. 1999); Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chem. Co.,
Inc., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994); B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545 (5th Cir.
1981).
231. See, e.g., Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co. 31 F.3d 1092, 1094-95 (11th Cir. 1994); Parker
v. Brown, 570 F. Supp. 640, 642 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
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procedure, the court will resolve that question by remanding the case

back to state court.232
Federal courts often base these presumptions upon the notion that a
plaintiff's right to choose a forum is somehow superior to a defendant's
removal right.2'
Thus, as one frequently quoted case has stated:
"Defendant's right to remove and plaintiff's right to choose his forum are
not on equal footing. ' '2 - Most federal courts235 start with the presumption
of remand for all removed cases.236 and many courts have expressly
rejected the notion that a defendant has an equal right to a federal
231
forum.
Contradicting earlier decisions and ignoring the. legislative
record, many federal courts also imply that removal rights do not derive
218
in any way from the Constitution.

232. See, e.g., Mulcahey, 29 F.3d at 151; Marshall v. Manville Sales Corp., 6 F.3d 229,
232 (4th Cir. 1993). Cf.Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002)
(finding that statutory procedures for removal are to be strictly construed); Laughlin v.
Kmart Corp., 50 F.3d 871, 873 (10th Cir. 1995) ("there is a presumption against removal
233. See, e.g., infra notes 234, 237 and accompanying text.
234. Burns, 31 F.3d at 1095.
235. Fortunately, there are a minority of decisions that reject the notion that federal
courts are intended primarily for the benefit of plaintiffs. See McKinney v. Bd. of Trs., 955
F.2d 924, 927 (4th Cir. 1992) (rejecting the suggestion that removal is "inherently bad" and
finding that "defendant's right to remove a case that could be heard in federal court is at
least as important as the plaintiff's right to the forum of his choice"); Garland v. Humble
Oil & Ref. Co., 306 F. Supp. 608, 610 (E.D. Tenn. 1969) ("While the plaintiff had a right to
choose initially the state court as the forum for this action, the defendant has a subsequent
equal right to resort herein to the federal court by complying with the removal statute
...");
Gentle v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 166-67 (D. Me. 1969) (refusing to allow
fraudulent devices to "the substantial frustration of defendant's constitutional and
statutory [removal] rights"); Bradley v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 100 F. Supp.
913, 916 (E.D. Okla. 1951) (noting that caution should be applied in remanding because
defendant has no means of obtaining review).
236. See, e.g., City of Univ. City v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d 927,
933 (E.D. Mo. 2002) ("there is a presumption in favor of remand"); Coca-Cola Bottling of
Emporia, Inc. v. South Beach Beverage Co., Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1285 (D. Kan.
2002) (adopting reasonable certainty test for calculating the amount in controversy
because of "the presumption against removal"); Harris Corp. v. Kollsman, Inc., 97 F.
Supp. 2d 1148, 1151 (M.D. Fla. 2000) ("To scrupulously confine removal jurisdiction,
federal courts have fashioned a presumption in favor of remand to state court.").
237. See, e.g., Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, 145 F.3d 211, 219 n.11 (5th Cir. 1998)
("The defendant's right to remove and the plaintiff's right to choose the forum are not
equal.") (internal citations omitted); Auchinleck v. Town of LaGrange, 167 F. Supp. 2d
1066, 1069 (E.D. Wis. 2001) ("The plaintiff's right to choose his forum is superior to the
defendant's right of removal.").
238. See, e.g., Al-Cast Mold & Pattern, Inc. v. Perception, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 2d 1081,
1083 (D. Minn. 1999) (finding the removal right is "not one granted under the
Constitution"); Indep. Mach. v. Int'l Tray Pads & Packaging, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 687, 693
(D.N.J. 1998) (same); but see In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 220 F. Supp. 2d 414, 425
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Stating that a plaintiff has a superior "right" to select a forum is merely
an unsupported claim, not a self-evident fact.23 9 Additionally, the courts
have not been articulate in explaining the source of this "right. 2 41 ' This
right certainly does not emanate from the Constitution.4 1 Nor is it
derived from any statute of general application. Instead, courts that take
the time to justify the plaintiff's supposedly superior "right" typically rely
upon policy reasons articulated over the last century. 242
First, courts frequently cite federalism as grounds for restricting the
defendant's right to remove to federal court.24 Indeed, federalism and
comity have been described as the "core rationale" behind the strict
construction of removal statutes..244 At the same time, most courts do not
explain precisely why it violates federalism when a federal court
exercises constitutionally authorized federal jurisdiction, and why these
24
courts simply proclaim that removal impinges on state sovereignty. 1
Often, these conclusions accompany a citation to Shamrock Oil, in which
the Court stressed that "[d]ue regard for the rightful independence of
state governments" requires scrupulous enforcement of the "precise
limits" of removal statutes.2
The second policy rationale underlying a plaintiff's superior "right"
involves a slight variation on the federalism theme.247 Courts cite the
need to construe all federal jurisdictional statutes narrowly because
federal courts are courts of limited, not general, jurisdiction.4 Often,
(E.D. Pa. 2002) (finding that the right of removal "emanates from Article III, Section 2 of
the Constitution").
239.

See supra note 235 (illustrating that not all federal courts have held that plaintiff's

have a superior right).
240. See infra note 245 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
242. See infra notes 244-56 and accompanying text.
243. See infra notes 244-46 and accompanying text.
244. Dardeau v. West Orange-Grove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 43 F. Supp. 2d 722, 730
(E.D. Tex. 1999). See also Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Safety Nat.'l Cas. Corp., 43 F.
Supp. 2d 734, 741 (E.D. Tex. 1999); Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chemical Co., 29 F. 3d
148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994).

245. See, e.g. Mulcahey, 29 F.3d at 151 ("Because removal jurisdiction raises significant
federalism concerns, we must strictly construe removal jurisdiction."); Bristol-Myers, 43 F.
Supp. 2d at 740 (removal strictly construed "to prevent encroachment on state courts'
jurisdiction and to preserve comity...").
246.

Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941); see also Long v.

Bando Mfg. of Am., Inc., 201 F.3d 754, 757 (6th Cir. 2000) (removal implicates federalism
concerns); Ferry v. Bekum Am. Corp., 185 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1287 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (i.e.
moral implicates federalism concerns).
247. See infra note 248.
248.

Bellone v. Roxbury Homes, 748 F. Supp. 434, 436 (W.D. Va. 1990) (because

federal courts have limited jurisdiction, they "should not be allowed to denigrate the
requirements of the removal statutes to enhance their jurisdiction"); Thompson v. Gillen,
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this argument joins with statements about federalism, 4 9 although the two
related concepts are, in some ways, distinct. Federal courts seeking to
restrict removal again cite to Shamrock Oil,25 ' and in particular to the
Supreme Court's statement that "the policy of the successive acts of
Congress regulating the jurisdiction of 25federal courts is one calling for the
strict construction of such legislation., '
Finally, federal courts also base the plaintiff's "right" upon the notion
that fairness and efficiency require a strict construction of removal
252
statutes.
Echoing Kessinger and Fitzgerald, these decisions assert that
because a court without jurisdiction cannot render a valid judgment,
efficiency would not allow a case to proceed to conclusion and produce a
judgment of no value.253 Such a result, some courts have
suggested,
2 4
would violate "fundamental fairness" towards the plaintiff.
It is these three policy concerns-federalism, the limited nature of
federal jurisdiction, and efficiency/fairness-that ostensibly underlie the
presumptions against removal and that serve to elevate the plaintiff's
right to select a forum to a higher pedestal than defendant's removal
right. In practice, courts typically rely on at least two of these factors to
justify strict presumptions against removal.215 Lying beneath the three
recognized grounds for presumptions against removal may exist unstated
reasons for why modern federal courts favor remand. Judges, like all
human beings, are subject to personal preferences, prejudices and
pressures that unconsciously shape their decisions. For example, it is
hardly a secret that many federal judges would welcome the curtailment
of diversity jurisdiction.
Additionally, a relatively widespread
491 F. Supp. 24, 26-27 (E.D. Va. 1980) (stressing that federal courts, as courts of limited
jurisdiction, "must take care" not to exceed their jurisdiction when deciding removal
questions).
249. See, e.g., Thompson, 491 F. Supp. at 26-27.
250. Id. at 26 (citing Shamrock Oil).
251. Shamrock Oil, 313 U.S. at 108.

252. See infra notes 253-54 and accompanying text.
253. See, e.g., Thompson, 491 F. Supp. at 26 ("[t]he prevailing judicial attitude rests on
the inexpediency, if not unfairness, of exposing [the parties] to . . . a final judgment in
federal court, only to have it determined that the court lacked jurisdiction on removal")
(quoting 14 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 3721 (1976));
Radeschi v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 846 F. Supp. 416, 419 (W.D. Pa. 1993)
(removal strictly construed because of the possibility of a "void" judgment).
254. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Safety Nat'l Gas. Corp., 43 F. Supp. 2d 734,
741 (E.D. Tex. 1999).

255. E.g., Curtin v. Port Auth. of N.Y., 183 F. Supp 2d. 664, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(noting all three grounds); Fenton v. Food Lion, Inc., No. Civ. A.3:02CV00017, 2002 WL
1969662 at *2 (W.D.Va. Aug. 23, 2002) (same).
256. See, e.g., Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction
through the Lens of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671, 1671-73 (1992) (citing the Federal
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perception exists that many federal judges consider removal
inappropriate in cases involving diversity jurisdiction. It would be
strange indeed if this judicial aversion to diversity jurisdiction did not
lead to broader restrictions on the removal process. In fact, in several
cases, courts have indicated that strict limitations upon the removal
process serve as an indirect means of restricting diversity jurisdiction.257
In addition to a particular distaste for diversity jurisdiction, some
decisions suggest that judicial hostility toward removal results more from
a practical desire to relieve overburdened federal dockets than from lofty
concerns regarding federalism or the institutional role of the courts.258
For example, in Themton Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, the district
court remanded a case because a less crowded docket would allow a
plaintiff to proceed more quickly in state court.259 The U.S. Supreme
Court reversed, noting that "an otherwise properly removed action may
no more be remanded because the district court considers itself too busy
to try it than an action properly filed in the federal court in the first
instance may be dismissed or referred to state courts for such reason. '2 1'
The unspoken question, however, is whether other less candid decisions
ordering remand have been influenced by the somewhat understandable
desire of a federal judge to reduce his caseload by removing a case from
his docket, particularly when his decision cannot be challenged on
appeal.261

Regardless of their true parentage, judicial presumptions against
removal exert a powerful impact on litigation. For almost a century,
federal courts have viewed all questions of removal practice through the
prism of these presumptions.262 The result of this longstanding practice
Courts Study Committee's agreement to recommend the limitation of diversity
jurisdiction); Judicial Conference of the U.S., Long Range Plan for the Fed. Courts, 166
F.R.D. 49, 89-92 (1996) (proposing curtailment of diversity jurisdiction).
257. See, e.g., Hurt v. Dow Chem. Co., 963 F.2d 1142, 1145 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding that
"diversity jurisdiction in removal cases [is] narrower than if the case were originally filed
in federal court by the plaintiff"); Zumas v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 907 F. Supp.
131, 134 (D. Md. 1995) (noting that the policy of comity in diversity cases favor remand);
Harris v. Huffco Petroleum Corp., 633 F. Supp. 250, 253 (S.D. Al. 1986) (determining that
in diversity cases removal statutes must be strictly construed); Thompson, 491 F. Supp. at
26-27 (discussing heightened concerns regarding removal of diversity cases).
258. See, e.g., Judicial Conference, supra note 256, at 90 (suggesting that "the federal
diversity docket constitutes a massive diversion of federal judge power away from their
principal function" of adjudicating).
259. Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 344 (1976).
260. Id. at 344.
261. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2001) (indicating that "[a]n order remanding a case to the
court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise") (emphasis
added).
262. Sloviter, supra note 256, at 1682.
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has been the creation of numerous barriers to removal that essentially
vest plaintiffs with a greater right than defendants to litigate in a federal
forum.
IV. A SAMPLING OF REMOVAL BARRIERS
Removal applies to claims that originally could have been brought in
federal court.16 ' Accordingly, removal jurisdiction has been described as
"coextensive with diversity and federal question jurisdiction. 2, 64 "Coextensive," however, is not the same as "co-equal." In fact, defendants
seeking to remove a case to federal court face a number of unique
obstacles not encountered by a plaintiff filing an original complaint in
federal court. 161 Some technical and procedural obstacles to removal are
derived directly from the language of the statute. For example, § 1441
prohibits
a 266
resident defendant from removing on the basis of diversity
....
jurisdiction.
Additionally, § 1446 imposes a one-year bar on the
267
removal of claims based on diversity jurisdiction.
Additional impediments, not necessarily apparent from the statutory
text, have been created as a result of the application of judicial
presumptions against removal. This section considers four separate areas
where judicial presumptions favoring remand have helped create
artificial barriers to removal: (1) a refusal to apply traditional equitable
exceptions to the one-year limit on removing diversity cases; (2) the
requirement of unanimity among removing defendants and the timing
implications of that requirement; (3) unnecessarily strict application of
the well-pleaded complaint rule in diversity actions; and (4) manipulation
of the amount in controversy by plaintiffs.26 First, however, this section
discusses one case where the Supreme Court has curtailed procedural
gamesmanship by eliminating a barrier to removal.

263.

28 U.S.C. § 1441.

264.

16 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 139, § 107.04.

265. See, e.g., id. § 107.14[3][a][iii] (indicating that "if a plaintiff's well pleaded
complaint filed in state court does not allege any federal question, the defendant
ordinarily may not remove the case to federal court, even if his or her defense or
counterclaim is based on federal law").
266. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
267. Id.§ 1446(b).
268. See generally Note, Devices to Avoid Diversity Jurisdiction, 44 HARv. L. REV. 97
(1931); Practice: Federal Jurisdiction: Uniformity: Preventing Removal of Causes by
Foregoing Part of Claim, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 307 (1930) (containing an early discussion of

devices used to defeat removal).
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2694

Perhaps the most notorious removal landmine arose from the 1948
statutory amendment that required a defendant to file his removal notice
72
1
within thirty days of receipt of a complaint by service "or otherwise.,
For forty years, federal courts disagreed over the interpretation of the
amendment's language. Some courts held that the statutory removal
period did not begin to run until a defendant had been served with both
process and the complaint.27' Other courts disagreed, holding that the
"or otherwise" language of the statute required the removal clock to
begin ticking as soon as the defendant received a copy of the complaint,
regardless of the complaint's method of delivery.272 Although courts
adopting this latter construction were cognizant of the opportunities for
manipulation their rulings provided, the courts relied upon judicial
presumptions against removal and the policies underlying those
presumptions, yet again, to support their decisions. 271 Often, they
included a Shamrock Oil citation in their analyses.274
While the courts debated the proper interpretation of the statutory
language, the plaintiffs' bar developed mechanisms to defeat a
defendant's removal right. For example, plaintiffs would file a complaint
and then, without effecting service, send a courtesy copy of the complaint
to the defendant or his counsel, along with a demand letter, but without a

269. For pre-Murphy Bros. discussion of these issues, see Robert P. Faulkner, The
Courtesy Copy Trap: Untimely Removal From State to Federal Court, 52 MD. L. REV. 374,
379-83 (1993); Danna Rohwer, Comment, The Forty-Year Dispute: What Triggers the Start
of the Removal Period Under 28 U.S.C. Section 1446(b), 61 UMKC L. REV. 359 (1992);
Derek S. Hollingsworth, Comment, Section 1446: Remedying the Fifth Circuit's Removal
Trap, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 157, 160-62 (1997). For scholarly comment written after
Murphy Brothers, see C. Todd Hagins, Sands in an Hourglass: Solving the Puzzle of Time
Limits for Removal to FederalCourt, 68 DEF. COUNS. J.421 (2001); Barbara A. Wiseman,
Applying Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc. to Removal in Multiple-Defendant
Lawsuits, LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323 (2000).
270. § 1446(b).
271. See, e.g., Bowman v. Weeks Marine, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 329, 333 (D.S.C. 1996);
Baratt v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 787 F. Supp. 333, 337 (W.D.N.Y. 1992); Love v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 542 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
272. See, e.g., Reece v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 839, 843-44 (5th Cir. 1996); Roe
v. O'Donohue, 38 F.3d 298, 304 (7th Cir. 1994); Trepel v. Kohn, Milstein, Cohen &
Hausfeld, 789 F. Supp. 881, 883 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Dawson v. Orkin Exterminating Co.,
Inc., 736 F. Supp. 1049, 1053 (D.Colo. 1990); Tyler v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 524 F.
Supp. 1211, 1213 (W.D.Pa. 1981).
273. See, e.g., Reece, 98 F.3d at 842 ("We recognize that the receipt rule is subject to
abuse.").
274. See, e.g., Roe, 38 F.3d at 304; Trepel, 789 F. Supp. at 883; Dawson, 736 F. Supp. at
1053.
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summons. 2
Alternatively, a plaintiff might provide a copy of the
complaint to a low-level employee or agent who could not be expected to
quickly get it to coroporate counsel. 276 In either case, the defendant may
be lulled into letting the thirty day statutory removal period lapse, a
period which applied in circuits governed by the so-called "receipt rule."
Fortunately, this problem was largely resolved by the decision in
Murphy Brothers, Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., in which the
Supreme Court rejected the receipt rule, holding that the statutory time
period for removal does not begin to run until both service of the
277
complaint and service of process have been effected..
In Murphy
Brothers, the plaintiff filed a complaint in Alabama state court for breach
of contract and fraud.276 Three days after filing, plaintiff sent the
defendant a courtesy copy of the complaint.279 Only after settlement
negotiations ceased did the plaintiff effect formal service of process. 26))
The defendant then removed the case to federal district court within
thirty days of formal service of the complaint, but more than thirty days
after the defendant received the courtesy copy."" The district court
rejected plaintiff's motion for removal and plaintiff appealed to the
282
Eleventh Circuit.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals viewed the statutory language
as unambiguous, holding that the removal clock began to run when the
defendant received a copy of the complaint, regardless of when, or even
if, formal service of process occurred. 2"' The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and reversed, holding that the removal time period cannot be
triggered until the defendant receives formal service of process. 264 This
conclusion naturally flowed from the "bedrock principle" that a
defendant need not participate in litigation until a court exercises
jurisdiction through formal service of process. 2691
Additionally, apart from the historical requirement of service of
process, the Court found that the text of the removal statute indicated
that the removal clock should not begin to run until service of process is
275. See, e.g., White v. White, 32 F. Supp. 2d 890, 891 (W.D. La. 1998); Love, 542 F.
Supp. at 67.
276. See, e.g., Tech Hills I1 Assocs. v. Phoenix Home Life Mut. Ins. Co., 5 F.3d 963,
966 (6th Cir. 1993).
277. 526 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1999).
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

Id. at 348.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 349.
Id.

284.

Id. at 356.

285. Id. at 347.
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effected.2 6 The Court traced the history of the removal statute and noted
that, "[p]rior to 1948, a defendant could remove a case any time before
2 7
the expiration of her time to respond to the complaint under state law. 1
The Court then noted that the 1948 Judicial Code enacted a uniform
time period that, was intended to "give adequate time and operate
uniformly throughout the Federal jurisdiction."2 s The revision adopted
in 1949, which added the "service or otherwise" language, was not
intended to achieve a different result. 289 Accordingly, the Court
construed the statute in a commonsense manner that "adheres to
tradition, makes sense of the phrase 'or otherwise,' and assures
defendants adequate time to decide whether to remove an action to
federal court. '' 290 Essentially, in construing the statute, the Court
assumed that Congress intended a fair and balanced removal practice.9'
In a short dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist (joined by Justices Scalia
and Thomas) noted that the majority decision in Murphy Brothers
departs from the practice of strictly construing removal statutes.292 At the
same time, the dissent did not suggest that in adopting an amendment
designed to make removal procedure more fair and uniform, Congress
intended to create procedural obstacles to removal that could be
exploited by plaintiffs and their attorneys. Instead, the dissent simply
cited to Shamrock Oil as support for the strict construction principle.293
Although the Court's opinion in Murphy Brothers left a number of
questions unanswered,
it significantly clarified removal practice and
reduced the opportunities for gamesmanship.
The decision also
demonstrated that federal courts need not allow self-created
286. Id. at 351-54.
287. Id. at 351.
288. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., A135 (1947)).
289. Id. at 351-53.
290. Id. at 354.
291. Id. at 356. Notably, the majority opinion contains no citation to Shamrock Oil
and nowhere recites the mantra of lower federal courts that all doubts should be resolved
in favor of a remand.
292. Id. at 357 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
293. Id.
294. For example, the decision does not address when the thirty-day period begins to
run if the plaintiff serves a statutory agent rather than the defendant himself. Compare
Ortiz v. Biscanin, 190 F. Supp. 2d 1237 (D. Kan. 2002) (stating that service on an agent
commences removal period), with Monterey Mushrooms, Inc. v. Hall, 14 F. Supp. 2d 988,
990-91 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (declaring that removal does not commence until the defendant
receives papers). Further, Murphy Bros. does not address timing issues that arise in cases
involving multiple defendants. See, e.g., Matthew J. Mussalli, Tick, Tock: Rules on the
Removal Clock, 19 Rev. Litig. 47, 54-59 (2000) (concluding that, as evidenced through
subsequent decisions, Murphy Bros. does not address the issue of service on multiple
defendants).
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presumptions to spawn artificial barriers to removal.2 95 This case reveals
how federal courts, after unshackling themselves from their self-imposed
presumptions, can achieve results that are both sensible and consistent
with the underlying purpose of removal. Although this case was a step in
the right direction, there remain many other areas of removal practice
that need a comparable overhaul.
B.

Use of Token Defendants to Prevent Removal

In the post-Murphy Brothers world, perhaps the most common vehicle
for procedural manipulation of removal statutes involves the use of
token nondiverse defendants to defeat removal. This manipulation is
fostered under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), a statute which allows a defendant
thirty days to remove an initially unremovable case that later becomes
removable, as a result of an "amended pleading, motion, order or other
paper. '' 296 Section 1446(b) fosters manipulation because it also provides
that a case may not be removed on the basis of diversity jurisdiction
more than one year after commencement of the action.297 This limitation,
imposed by a 1988 amendment, applies even where the basis for federal
Thus, by
jurisdiction does not appear in the initial complaint. "
disguising the existence of federal jurisdiction for more than a year after
the filing of the complaint, a plaintiff can cause the period for removal to
expire before the defendant is capable of removing the action.
Plaintiffs take full advantage of this situation. As one guide to
avoiding removal candidly advises plaintiffs' attorneys: "if the plaintiff
can ethically do so, an attempt should be made to destroy diversity by
naming at least one resident defendant. '' 299 In fact, it is not unusual for a
plaintiff to name as a defendant a party from whom the plaintiff has no
Furthermore, unless it can be said
intention of seeking any recovery:
295. Cf.Ariel Land Owners, Inc. v. Dring, 245 F. Supp. 2d. 589, 594-95 (M.D.Pa. 2003)
("I take Murphy Bros. to indicate that the Justices have chosen not [to] follow a statute's
supposed 'plain meaning' without first carefully considering purpose and policy.").

296. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000). For example, a defendant may remove a case when an
amended complaint alleges a federal claim in a case previously including only state law
claims. Or, if a complaint for a modest amount of damages is amended to request
damages in excess of $75,000, diversity jurisdiction may exist over a claim that previously

was unremovable.
297.
298.

Id. § 1446(b).
See supra notes 201-05 and accompanying text (discussing the 1988 statutory

amendment).
299. Allyson Singer Breeden, Federal Removal Jurisdiction and Its Effect on Plaintiff
Win-Rates, 46 REs GESTAE 26, 30 (2002). See also id. at 31 (advising plaintiffs to be
"wary" of admitting that the statutory minimum for diversity jurisdiction is exceeded).
300. See, e.g., Mem. of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff's Remand Mot., Gibbs v. Black
& Decker (U.S.) Inc., No. 03 Civ. 0860 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (on file with author) (describing
removal of an action in which plaintiff named her own grandmother as an additional
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with complete certainty that no claim could possibly be brought against
such a defendant under state law, the courts will often treat these bogus
parties as if they are real.
Accordingly, a plaintiff can easily defeat
removal by finding a friendly, impecunious, or disinterested non-diverse
defendant and then waiting
3 2 until after the one-year expiration before
dismissing that defendant.
Another common tactic is to delay an amendment of the amount in
controversy until after the one-year limit has passed. In one case, for
example, a plaintiff pled damages of $49,999 (i.e., $0.01 below the
statutory threshold for diversity jurisdiction at that time), waited until
passage of the one-year bar, and then amended the complaint to increase
the ad damnum to $150,000 and to seek punitive damages.3 3 By this
maneuver, the plaintiff successfully prevented removal of the case. The
district court acknowledged that its decision "has the effect of permitting
a plaintiff to lie in wait with his or her amended complaint containing an
increased ad damnum, and thereby to keep diversity litigation in a State
Court., 304 Nevertheless, the court felt constrained to strictly apply the
one-year limit on removal.
It would seem that an obvious response to gamesmanship of the kind
described in the two preceding examples would be to allow defendants to
remove after one-year where the plaintiff has inequitably engaged in
procedural maneuvering. After all, federal courts long have prevented
tactical manipulation of procedural rules that achieve unfair results;
statutes of limitation, for example, are often "tolled" for equitable
T

defendant in a products liability action against a manufacturer). The author participated
as counsel for the manufacturer in opposing the subsequent remand motion.
301. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Am. Telecasting, Inc., 261 F.3d 196, 207 (2d Cir. 2001)
(explaining that a defendant must show no possibility of a claim in order to establish
fraudulent joinder). See also Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc. 187 F.3d 422, 424 (4th Cir. 1999)
(declaring that "[t]o show fraudulent joinder, the removing party must demonstrate ...
that 'there is no possibility that the plaintiff would be able to establish a cause of action
against the in-state defendant in state court."').
302. See Breeden, supra note 299, at 31 ("If it becomes necessary to voluntarily dismiss
a defendant that destroyed diversity, a carefully timed dismissal that occurs outside of the
one-year time limit for removing diversity cases might thwart the defendant's attempt to
remove."). See also In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 00Civ.2843, 02Civ.6827, 2003
WL 21355201 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2003) (discussing the non-suiting of a non-diverse
defendant one year and five days after service of complaint); Caudill v. Ford Motor Co.,
271 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1326 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (upholding the dismissal of a non-diverse
defendant one year and six days after service).
303. Cofer v. Horsehead Research & Dev. Co., Inc., 805 F. Supp. 541, 542 (E.D. Tenn.
1991).
304. Id. at 544.
305. Id. (suggesting that Congress, rather than the courts, amend the one-year limit).
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reasons: The courts also consider equitable factors in deciding whether
to grant an extension of the time for an appeal.3 7 In fact, the Fifth
Circuit recently relied on precisely this logic in holding that equitable
exceptions can be made to the one year-bar on removal of diversity
actions.'
In so doing, the court noted that equitable tolling principles
are common in civil litigation and that the time limits for removal are
"merely modal and formal., 3' Accordingly, it allowed the tolling of the
one-year deadline to prevent the plaintiff from employing procedural
gamesmanship to defeat the defendant's removal right."' The court
explained, "strict application of the one-year limit would encourage
plaintiffs to join non diverse defendants for 366 days simply to avoid
federal court, thereby undermining the very purpose of diversity
jurisdiction., 3" Moreover, even if Congress intended to limit diversity
through the 1988 amendment, "it did not intend to allow plaintiffs to
circumvent it altogether.""'
Unfortunately, some federal courts have declined to follow Tedford3 3
and pre-Tedford
314 many courts are less troubled by
se odecisions suggest
. that
the
proedurl
the use of procedural maneuvering.
Thus, while openly acknowledging
that plaintiffs' lawyers manipulate the statute to defeat a defendant's
removal right, many federal courts have concluded that they do not have
the power to extend the one-year deadline, despite a plaintiff's blatant
tactics.315 Instead, these courts hold that equitable principles have no
306. See, e.g., Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (holding
that the filing of a Title VII claim is subject to "equitable tolling"); Burnett v. N.Y. Cent.
R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 434-35 (1965) (concluding that the limitations period in FELA
actions is subject to equitable tolling); C.M. English v. Pabst Brewing Co., 828 F.2d 1047,
1049 (4th Cir. 1987) (discussing the doctrine of equitable tolling).
307. See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 394
(1993) (finding the "excusable neglect" standard for grant of extension is an equitable
determination).
308. See Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2003).
309. Id. at 426.
310. Id. at 427.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. See, e.g., Mantz v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. Civ.A.2:03-0506, 2003 WL
21383830, at *2 (S.D. W.Va. June 13, 2003) (rejecting Tedford and refusing to recognize
equitable exceptions to one year bar).
314. See, e.g., Martine v. Nat'l Tea Co., 841 F. Supp. 1421, 1422 (M.D. La. 1993)
(ordering remand despite that "[b]y delaying service on [defendant] for over a year,
plaintiffs ensured that this action could not be timely removed by [defendant] to a federal
forum"); Russaw v. Voyager Life Ins. Co., 921 F. Supp. 723, 725 (M.D. Ala. 1996)
(concluding that if more than a year has passed even fraudulent joinder provides no
ground for remand).
315. See, e.g., Russaw, 921 F. Supp. at 724 (stating that "[t]he court finds that Congress
did not intend to except fraudulent joinder"); Martine, 841 F. Supp. at 1421 (ordering
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application in cases involving removal. They therefore hold that the oneyear period is jurisdictional and cannot be altered even where the
This conclusion is usually
plaintiff has resorted to gamesmanship.
reached immediately after rote pronouncements of the need to construe
removal statutes strictly.' 7 Essentially, courts have consciously allowed
judicially created presumptions to impose a barrier to removal, which
encourages tactical manipulation of procedural rules by plaintiffs.318
C. Multiple Defendants and the Rule of Unanimity
Section 1446 of 28 U.S.C. provides for removal by "[the] defendant or
the defendants" and requires the "defendant or defendants" to file the
notice of removal.3" 9 Although alternative constructions of the statutory
language seem plausible, courts long have required unanimity in
removal. 20 This means that a removal notice will be deemed defective if,
for unexplained reasons, all defendants do not join in the removal
petition or indicate their approval."' In other words, "[t]he rule of
unanimity gives each defendant an absolute veto over removal. 3 22 The
stated reason for this rule is that all defendants have an equal right to
remain in state court.323

The rule of unanimity, which federal courts rigorously enforce,
prevents a defendant from simply alleging that all defendants consent to
removal. 324 Although the requirement is not found in the text for the
remand despite "grave concerns about a plaintiff intentionally withholding service until
the one year period for removal has run"); Hom v. Serv. Merch. Co., Inc., 727 F. Supp.
1343, 1344-46 (N.D.Cal. 1990) (concluding that Section 1446(b) requires remand under the
one-year-after-commencement rule even though process was served upon the defendants
only thirty days before removal).
316. See, e.g., Caudill v. Ford Motor Co., 271 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1326, 1327 (N.D. Okla.
2003) (refusing to allow equitable exception despite plaintiff's use of a "classic example"
of "tactical chicanery"); Codner v. Am. Home Products Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1274
(W.D. Okla. 2000).
317. See, e.g., Caudill, 271 F. Supp. 2d. at 1327 (citing Shamrock Oil); Ariel Land
Owners, Inc. v. Dring, 245 F. Supp. 2d 589, 601 (M.D. Pa. 2003).
318. To complicate matters further, the courts also disagree over whether the one-year
rule applies to all diversity cases or only to cases that are not initially removable.
Compare Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313, 1316 (9th Cir. 1998) (former view),
with Foiles v. Merrell Nat'l Labs., 730 F. Supp. 108, 110 (N.D. II1.1989) (latter view).
319. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a)-(b) (2000).
320. See, e.g., Beardsley v. Torrey, 2 F. Cas. 1188, 1189 (D. Pa. 1822).
321. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Borg-Warner Auto., Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 817 (S.D. W.Va.
2002); see also Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364, 368 (7th Cir. 1993).
322. Garside v. Osco Drug Co., 702 F. Supp. 19, 21 (D. Mass. 1988).
323. E.g., Town of Fairfax v. Ashbrook, 3 F. Supp. 345 (1933).
324. See, e.g., Faulk v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 48 F. Supp. 2d 653, 667-69
(E.D. Tex. 1999) (requiring all 185 defendants served by plaintiffs to join in the removal
petition).
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removal statutes,"' courts require each defendant to either execute a
written consent to removal or be represented by the attorney who signs
the removal papers.326 This judicially created requirement is once again
justified by the usual arguments in favor of construing removal strictly.
Where this inefficient procedural requirement is not met, federal courts
will ignore the substantive question of whether all defendants intended
to remove the case to federal court and instead simply order a remand. 28
Consider Erie Insurance Exchange v. Sunbeam-Oster; Inc., where the
plaintiff sued a product manufacturer, the manufacturer's parent
corporation, and various "doe defendants." 329 Under Maryland law, the
parent corporation was considered a nominal party, and under federal
law, the fictitious doe defendants were disregarded for removal
purposes.
Accordingly, the product manufacturer, the only true
defendant, removed the case to federal court. 311 In remanding the case,
the district court held that although the doe defendants and the parent
corporation appeared to be nominal parties who could be disregarded for
purposes of removal, the failure to "account" for them in the removal
notice rendered removal defective.332 Thus, although the court assumed
there was a substantive basis for the exercise of diversity jurisdiction, and
although the only true defendant and all its corporate affiliates clearly
consented to removal, "the requirement that courts strictly construe the
removal statute," necessitated remand.333

325. Cf Still v. Debuono, 927 F. Supp. 125, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that the rule
of unanimity is a judicially created rule).
326. See Dorsey v. Borg-Warner Auto., Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 817 (S.D. W.Va. 2002);
Fenton v. Food Lion Inc., No. Civ.A.3:02CV00017, 2002 WL 1969662, at *2-3 (W.D. Va.
Aug. 23, 2002).
327. See Fenton, 2002 WL 1969662, at *2 (noting policy reasons for strictly construing
removal right). See also Dorsey, 218 F. Supp. at 818 ("If federal jurisdiction is doubtful,
remand is necessary.").
328. See, e.g., Codapro Corp. v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 322 (E. D.N.Y. 1998) (finding
that a letter from co-defendants removing defendants was insufficient indication of
consent to removal where it was not communicated directly to the court); Diebel v. S.B.
Trucking Co., 262 F. Supp. 2d 1319, 1329 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (remanding case where same
counsel represented all defendants at time of remand motion, but not when removal
notice was filed).
329. Erie Ins. Exch. v. Sunbeam-Oster, Inc., No. AW-00-3723, slip op. (D. Md. Aug.
21, 2003). Members of the author's firm represented the defendants in this case.
330. See id. at 2.
331. Id. at 1-2.
332. Id. at 3-4.
333. Id. at 3; see also N. Ill. Gas. Co. v. Airco Indus. Gases, 676 F.2d 270, 273 (7th Cir.
1982) (citing Wright v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 98 F. 2d 34, 36 (8th Cir. 1938); Heckleman
v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 45 F. Supp. 984, 985 (E.D. 11. 1942); Santa Clara County v.
Goldy Machine Co., 159 F. 750, 750-51 (N.D. Cal. 1908) (stating that "a petition filed by
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The decisions discussed above present a vivid contrast to nineteenth
century removal decisions that refused to "let the nominal prevail over
the actual ...[or to] follow the letter rather than the spirit."'3 4 The true
opportunity for manipulation arises, however, when the rule of
unanimity is combined with the statutory requirement that a defendant

remove within thirty days of service."' Some courts sensibly construe
this rule as requiring all defendants to move or otherwise join in a
removal petition within thirty days of service of process upon the lastserved defendant. Other courts, relying on the doctrine that removal is
strictly construed, hold that the removal clock runs from the time of
service on the first-served defendant. 3 7

A third group holds that a

separate removal "clock" runs for each defendant based upon the date
that defendant received service."3 "
In circuits applying either of the latter two constructions, a plaintiff
enjoys ample room to manipulate the system. 339 For example, a plaintiff
suing multiple defendants may select the defendant least likely to remove
the case, perhaps an individual defendant unlikely to retain counsel, and
effect service upon that defendant.3 " Subsequently, after thirty days pass
and the removal period expires, the plaintiff will then, and only then,
serve a corporate defendant with deep pockets who, if permitted,
certainly would encourage all defendants to remove the case to federal
court.34 In circuits adopting either the first-served defendant rule or the
multiple-trigger rule, removal may prove impossible in some situations
because a later served defendant may lose his right to remove if an
earlier-served defendant already waived his removal right. 142 Essentially,

less than all of the named defendants is considered defective if it fails to contain an
explanation for the absence of co-defendants").
334. San Antonio Suburban Irrigated Farms v. Shandy, 29 F.2d 579, 581 (D. Kan.
1928).
335. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000).
336. See, e.g., Brown v. Tokio Marine and Fire Ins. Co., 284 F.3d 871, 873 (8th Cir.
2002); Marano Enter. of Kan. v. Z-Teca Rests., L.P., 254 F.3d 753, 756-57 (8th Cir. 2001).
337. See, e.g., N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Deshotel, 142 F.3d 873, 887 n.4 (5th Cir. 1998)
(citing Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 481 & n.] 1 (5th Cir. 1986); Getty Oil Corp. v.
Ins. Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 1262-63 (5th Cir. 1988)); Varney v. Johns-Manville
Corp. 653 F. Supp. 839, 840 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets,
313 U.S. 100 (1941); Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1979);
Godman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 588 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Schmidt v. Nat'l
Org. for Women, 562 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Fla. 1983).
338. See, e.g., McKinney v. Bd. of Trs. of Md. Cmty. Coll., 955 F.2d 924, 928 (4th Cir.
1992); Holden v. City of Atlanta, 925 F. Supp. 783, 785 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
339. Auchinleck v. Town of LaGrange, 167 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1070 (E.D. Wis. 2001).
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F. 2d 478, 481-82 (5th Cir. 1986).
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once an earlier-served defendant waives his removal right there can be
no additional attempt. 4' Thus, by carefully timing service of process
upon different defendants, plaintiffs44 can effectively strip later-served
defendants of their right to removal.
Courts are well aware that they are creating opportunities for plaintiffs
to defeat a defendant's removal right by adhering to either the firstserved defendant rule or the multiple-trigger rule.3 45 Nevertheless,
unfairness will not stand in the way of "faithful adherence" to the
removal statutes.
Instead, and once again, purported concerns for
federalism and respect for a plaintiff's right to forum selection trump
fairness, and foster an environment where procedural gamesmanship is
tolerated, if not explicitly encouraged.
D. Application of the Well-pleaded Complaint Rule in Diversity Cases
A defendant seeking to exercise his removal right may face another
removal obstacle that arises from the application of the "well-pleaded
complaint" rule to the question of whether diversity exists between
parties. 347 Under the well-pleaded complaint doctrine, courts determine
the existence of federal jurisdiction from the face of the plaintiff's
properly pleaded complaint.3 4 For example, in determining whether a
federal claim has been alleged, the courts will not go beyond the pleading
to ascertain what the plaintiff could or should have pleaded; courts will
look solely what has been pleaded. 34 9 This rule makes perfect sense when
the plaintiff initiates suit in federal court. After all, the plaintiff, as
master of his claims, should bear the burden of properly pleading his
right to be in federal court.350
Problems emerge, however, when the courts strictly apply the wellpleaded complaint rule to defendants attempting removal to federal
court. Upon removal, the defendant bears the burden of proving federal
jurisdiction.9 ' In satisfying this burden, defendant faces the additional
problem that the pleading upon which a court will base its jurisdictional
determination was drafted by the defendant's opponent. Some plaintiffs'
attorneys take deliberate advantage of this situation by drafting their
343. Id.
344. Auchinleck, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 1070.
345. Id. at 1069 (stating that "in the removal context, faithful adherence to the
statutory language is more important than avoiding potential unfairness").
346. Id.
347. See 16 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 139, § 107.14[3][a][iii].
348. Id.
349. See id.
350. See id.
351. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
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pleadings in a way that makes removal difficult, if not impossible. For
example, a plaintiff may disguise a claim based on federal law as a state
law claim.352 This imposes upon a defendant the burden of proving that
the case, although disguised as a state law claim, actually requires a
determination of federal law.353
Even more ,troubling issues can arise in diversity cases. Consider the
situation facing a defendant who seeks to remove a breach of contract
action brought by a Virginia partnership against a Maryland resident in a
Virginia court. For purposes of determining diversity jurisdiction, the
citizenship of the plaintiff partnership is that of its constituent partners.
The defendant's attorney may strongly suspect that the plaintiff
partnership is comprised of two individuals who are citizens of Virginia.
Nevertheless, if the plaintiff deliberately omits this information from the
complaint, absent some other concrete evidence of citizenship, the
As a result, the defendant is
defendant cannot remove the case. 154
relegated to state court until he can compel the plaintiff to produce an
amended pleading or other "paper" identifying the residency of the
individual partners.355
As has been demonstrated, plaintiff's failure to state his residency is
yet another gamesmanship maneuver. As a result, defendant is forced to
seek that information through the discovery process in the state court
116
However, it is not unusual for a plaintiff to delay providing this
action.
material by refusing to provide such discovery answers on grounds of
relevancy, thereby forcing defendant to obtain an order from the state
court compelling production. If the plaintiff can delay disclosure until
more than a year after the filing of the complaint, the case becomes
352. See 16 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 139, at § 107.14[3][b][iv]
(discussing the artful pleading doctrine and the removal of federal claims which purport to
be state law claims).
353. See, e.g., Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 122 S. Ct. 1753 (2002);
Ormet Corp. v. Ohio Power Co., 98 F.3d 799 (4th Cir. 1996).
354. See, e:g., Lovern v. Gen. Motors Corp., 121 F.3d 160, 162 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating
that. the test for removal is objective and is based upon what the documents exchanged
between the parties reveal); Shank Land Co. LLC v. Ark. Land Co., 170 F. Supp. 2d 660,
661-62 (S.D. W.Va. 2001) (finding that where the initial pleading did not reveal the
citizenship of the parties, the removal clock would not begin to run until receipt of the
paper providing that information). Although a defendant may challenge the citizenship
allegations in the complaint, he cannot affirmatively allege the citizenship of the parties
upon information and belief.
355. See Shank Land Co., 170 F. Supp. 2d at 661-62.
356. See, e.g., id.; Lovern, 121 F. 3d at 161. See also Kaneshiro v. N. Am. Co. for Life
& Health, 496 F. Supp. 452, 462 n.22 (D. Haw. 1980) (stating that as an alternative to

interrogatories, a defendant may submit a request to admit in order to determine, the
propriety of removal); Scott v. S.F. Greiner, 858 F. Supp. 607, 610 n.2 (S.D. W.Va. 1994)
(indicating that if a defendant considers a plaintiff's allegations too vague for seeking
removal, the party should seek more definite statement in state court).
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statutorily unremovable." Moreover, if the defendant waits for concrete
facts to support a removal petition, the court may conclude that
defendant ignored obvious clues and waived his right to remove." Once
again, judicially created presumptions against removal foster an
environment in which procedural gamesmanship flourishes at the
expense of a defendant's right to removal.
E. Manipulationof the Amount in Controversy
Another fertile ground for manipulation of removal involves the
amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction.
A
defendant removing a case on the basis of diversity must establish that
the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, "exclusive of interest and
costs."35 9

Because the well-pleaded complaint rule applies to the

determination of jurisdictional issues, however, the defendant typically is
bound by a demand contained in the complaint." '
Plaintiffs, of course, are well aware that if they plead substantial
damages in their initial complaint, a defendant may remove the case on
grounds of diversity jurisdiction. Accordingly, plaintiffs may successfully
defeat removal by deliberately understating damages in their initial
complaint. 6' For example, in Barber v. Albertsons, the plaintiff initially
filed a state court action alleging damages in excess of $10,000.362 The
defendant then served a request for admission asking the plaintiff to
admit or deny that the amount in controversy did not exceed the
jurisdictional threshold for diversity jurisdiction.3 63 The plaintiff denied
the request for admission.3 64 The plaintiff, therefore, "refused to admit
that the amount in controversy does not exceed $50,000.00 [the minimum
amount required to trigger diversity jurisdiction]. 365 Nevertheless, after
remarking that a plaintiff's right to choose a forum is superior to a
defendant's removal right, the court remanded the case on grounds that
plaintiff's reply did not provide the underlying facts necessary to

357. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000). See also supra notes 219-21 and accompanying
text.
358. See, e.g., Kaneshiro, 496 F. Supp. at 460 (stating that averment of residence in the
complaint is a "clue" regarding citizenship that requires the defendant to remove within
thirty days); see also Kanter & Eisenberg v. Madison Assocs., 602 F. Supp. 798, 801 (N.D.
I11.1985)
359. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000).

360. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283,288-89, 291 (1938).
361. See infra note 362 and accompanying text.
362.

935 F. Supp. 1188,1188-89 (N.D. Okla. 1996).

363.

Id. at 1191.

364.

Id.

365.

Id. at 1191.
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366

establish jurisdiction.
Adding insult to injury, the court suggested that
a thorough factual analysis of the plaintiff's ....
claims by
367 the defendant
could have established a basis for diversity jurisdiction.
Once again, a
Twentieth Century court rendered a removal decision that would have
been unimaginable to nineteenth century
courts that had refused to
368
"follow the letter rather than the spirit."
Defendants with a good faith belief that diversity jurisdiction exists in
a given case, but who cannot substantiate that belief at the inception of a
case, face a Hobson's choice. If the defendant removes, the district court
may remand the case and perhaps assess fees and costs against him.6 9
Alternatively, if the defendant delays removal until such time when the
plaintiff acknowledges the true amount in controversy or the citizenship
of the parties, the defendant may find, through inaction, that he has
waived his right of removal.
Of course, once a year passes, the case
becomes unremovable anyway. 7 '
A related problem arises when a defendant's counterclaim in state
court satisfies the amount in controversy requirement, but the plaintiff's
initial claim does not. In some circuits, a plaintiff filing in federal court
may rely on both his own claim and the defendant's •371
compulsory

counterclaim to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement. Many
courts have concluded, however, that the same does not hold true when a
defendant seeks to remove an action to federal court based, in wholeS or
373,
in part, on the amount placed in controversy by his counterclaim.
Thus, if the party with the smaller claim files first in state court, the

366. See Id. at 1189-93.
367. Id. at 1192-93.
368. San Antonio Suburban Irrigated Farms v. Shandy, 29 F.2d 579, 581 (D. Kan.
1928).
369. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2000) (stating that a plaintiff who obtains a
remand order may be awarded his costs and attorneys' fees).
370. See, e.g., Booth v. Furlough, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 629, 633 (E.D. Va. 1998) (asserting
that a defendant faced with obvious removal grounds must remove or waive his right to do
so).

371. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2000) (noting that a "case may not be removed on the
basis of jurisdiction ... more than 1 year after commencement of the action").
372. See generally Spectacor Mgt. Group v. Brown, 131 F. 3d 120, 121 (3d Cir. 1997);
McPherson v. Brinecell, Inc., 98 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 1996); Fenton v. Freedman, 748 F.2d
1358 (9th Cir. 1984).
373. See, e.g., Kenray, Inc. v. Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc., No. NA02-132-C B/H,
2002 WL 2012439, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 28, 2002); FLEXcon Co., Inc. v. Ramirez
Commercial Arts, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 185, 187 (D. Mass. 2002); Al-Cast Mold & Pattern,
Inc. v. Perception, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1083 (D. Minn. 1999); St. Paul Reinsurance
Co., Ltd. v. Greenberg, 134 F.3d 1250, 1254 (5th Cir. 1998); Davis v. Mut. of Omaha Ins.
Co., 290 F. Supp. 217, 220 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
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Conversely, if the party with the larger claim
matter is non-removable.
files first in federal court, the case will remain there. 37 The result is a
race to the courthouse steps.376
The courts have little sympathy for the defendant. For example, one
federal district court found that although making federal jurisdiction
dependant upon a race to the courthouse was "certainly an undesirable
result," the policy of limiting removal dictated that it exclude a
defendant's counterclaim from calculation of the amount in
controversy.377 Decisions favoring strict construction of jurisdictional
statutes over local procedural rules invoke Shamrock Oil for support.
The aformentioned obstacles to removal are by no means allinclusive. 379 Nor has this article purported to cover all of the procedural
games a plaintiff may employ to defeat removal:.1

Hopefully, the issues

described above provide a flavor of the present state of federal removal
practice. To be blunt, removal practice is unfair, unseemly, and
inefficient.
V.

EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM

A.

Widespread Gamesmanship

The current state of removal law is not pleasant. Courts apply
presumptions against removal with strictness and vigor: This results in
a web of judicially created obstacles that subvert a defendant's right to
Of course, the existence of procedural
litigate in a federal forum.
necessarily indicate a problem with
alone,
standing
does
not,
obstacles
elected to do so, it could, within
Congress
If
practice.
removal
current
374. See Kenray, 2002 WL 2012439 at *4; FLEXcon, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 187; Al-Cast, 52
F. supp. 2d at 1083; Greenberg, 134 F. 3d at 1254.
375. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1332(9) (2000) (stating that the amount in controversy
must exceed $75,000).
376. See infra note 377 and accompanying text.
377. Maloan v. Bancorpsouth Bank, Inc., No. 01-1366, 2002 WL 1397266 at *34 (W.D.
Tenn. Mar. 29, 2002).
378. See, e.g., id. at *3-*4 (citing Shamrock Oil); Al-Cast, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 1083 (citing
Shamrock Oil for proposition that removal must be narrowly construed).
379. See, e.g., Willingham v. Creswell-Keith, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 741, 743-44, W.D. Ark.
1958) (suggesting that a case should be remanded where defendant removed to the wrong
division within the correct federal district).
380. See, e.g., Briddelle v. T&J Foods, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 611, 612 (D. Md. 1998)
(attempting to defeat removal, plaintiff split related causes of action into two separate
state court cases to prevent removal of state law claim).
381. See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
382. See supra Part IV.B.
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the confines of equal protection and due process, construct a host of
procedural traps to make removal exceedingly difficult.YO Arguably,
Congress could abolish removal jurisdiction altogether."'
The aforementioned obstacles do not, however, result from laws
enacted by Congress; rather, they result from judicial gloss created by the
application of presumptions against removal to statutory language. 5 For
example, when determining the amount in controversy for purposes of
removal, nothing in the federal statutes prohibits a court from
considering a compulsory counterclaim."' Additionally, nothing in the
language of the removal statutes clearly requires the consent of all
defendants before removal."7 Nor does any statute preclude the
application of traditional equitable exceptions to the one-year limit on
removal found in Section 1446 of 28 U.S.C. 3' Instead, federal courts
have created these and other obstacles as a result of the application of
strict presumptions against removal.' 9
In effect, ordinary rules of statutory construction have been turned on
their heads. Rather than seeking to interpret removal statutes in a
manner consistent with equity and common sense, courts apply a strict
construction to removal statutes even when it leads to patently unfair
results. 39" Rather than seeking to achieve a statutory construction that
furthers a longstanding congressional desire for fair and uniform
procedures, courts justify confusion and arbitrary results with the
assurance that removal must be limited. 9

383.
384.
385.
386.

Moreover, many courts seem

See U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
Id.
See supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
Cf Swallow & Assocs. v. Henry Molded Prods., Inc., 794 F. Supp. 660, 663 (E.D.

Mich. 1992). Swallow takes note of the presumption against removal, but suggests that the
statutes may be construed strictly, yet it also allows the damages pled in a compulsory
counterclaim to be included:

Against inclusion is the argument that the Congress has demonstrated an intent
to limit the removal and diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts. Since the
removal and diversity statutes do not specifically permit consideration of any
counterclaims, the statutes should be interpreted strictly to prohibit such
consideration and defeat removal jurisdiction that is based on the damages pled
in the compulsory counterclaim.
Id.
387.

See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1146-1148 (2000).

388.

See id.

389.
390.

See supra Part IV.
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.

391.

See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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entirely undisturbed by the fact that defendants' constitutionally based
removal rights are routinely destroyed by lawyers' procedural games.'9'
Presumptions against removal have created a system in which
procedural gamesmanship is rewarded, and where form is elevated over
substance.393 That same system has also created rampant confusion and
splits among the courts. In short, the practical effect of judicially created
presumptions has been a state of judicial chaos.
At a theoretical level, arguably, presumptions of any kind are
inappropriate when construing removal statutes. For example, Justice
Scalia argued that presumptions necessarily import judicial bias into the
simple act of construing language. 394 Accordingly, in his view, "[a] text
should not be construed strictly, and it should not be construed leniently;
it should be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means.''
Nevertheless, one need not adopt Justice Scalia's views of statutory
interpretation to reach the conclusion that judicial presumptions against
removal are inappropriate. For the policy arguments underlying those
presumptions are simply not tenable.
B.
1.

Excuses for Gamesmanship

The PlaintiffsSupposedly Superior Right to Select the Forum

Strict construction of removal statutes is often excused on the grounds
that a plaintiff possesses a superior "right" to select the forum of his
choice.93 6 However, little attention has been paid to the basis for this
supposed "right." It is not found in the text of the Constitution.39 7 To the
contrary, the Constitution draws no distinctions between plaintiffs and
defendants.9
Rather, it authorizes categories of potential federal
jurisdiction and leaves for Congress the decision of how to implement
that jurisdiction.3 9 Thus, federal question jurisdiction exists only because
Congress authorized the federal courts to exercise that jurisdiction
392. See, e.g., Auchinleck v. Town of LaGrange, 167 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1069 (E.D. Wis.
2001) (stating that "in the removal context, faithful adherence to the statutory language is
more important than avoiding potential unfairness"); Fenton v. Food Lion, Inc., No.
Civ.A.3:02CV00017, 2002 WL 1969662, at *6 (W.D.Va. Aug. 23, 2002) (remanding the
case but commenting that "if not for the procedural failures in the LLC's removal, federal
jurisdiction might have been appropriate").
393. See, e.g., supra note 380 and accompanying text.
394.

See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:

AND THE LAW (1997).

395.
396.
397.
398.

Id. at 23.
See supra notes 251-54 and accompanying text.
See generally U.S. CONST., art III.
See generally id.

399.

See id.. art. 111. 4 2.

FEDERAL COURTS
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beginning in 1875. 41"' Diversity jurisdiction exists, with restrictions, only
because of statutory enactments beginning with the first Judiciary Act of
1789. 4°"

If anything, constitutional principles would appear to refute the notion
that plaintiffs possess a superior right to a federal forum. As Justice Story
noted long ago in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, the Constitution generally
does not discriminate against classes of citizens, but confers equal rights
upon all. 42 Or, in his words, "[t]he constitution of the United States was
designed for the common and equal benefit of all the people of the
United States.",413 Certainly significant tension exists between, on the one
hand, a constitutional system that envisions all citizens having access to
the federal courts and, on the other hand, judicial presumptions that
provide greater access to one class of citizens, plaintiffs, at the expense of
another, defendants.
Similarly, Congress has not anointed plaintiffs with a superior right to
decide the venue in which to litigate claims implicating federal
jurisdiction. There is neither a general statute to this effect, nor an
amendment to the removal statutes indicating that Congress ever
intended for plaintiffs to enjoy a preferred access to the federal courts.
To the contrary, statutory amendments show that Congress consistently
has sought to make removal practice fair and balanced ° In sum, there is
no textual support for the proposition that plaintiffs possess a superior
right to select or avoid federal jurisdiction.
In any event, favoritism towards plaintiffs simply represents bad
policy. As Justice Story recognized long ago, it is fundamentally unfair
for plaintiffs alone to decide which cases federal cours will hear.
Federal jurisdiction is defined by subject matter, not by the whim of the
party who initiates the action. Providing plaintiffs with a superior right
to select the judicial forum elevates one party's strategic litigation
preference over the structural constitutional principle of equal justice.
Moreover, favoritism toward plaintiffs distorts the substantive
character of cases heard by federal courts.
For example, the
constitutional authorization of diversity jurisdiction was not intended by
the Framers to primarily benefit either plaintiffs or defendants, but
rather it seeks to protect all citizens who may suffer local prejudice in a
foreign court.4
There is no reason to believe that a defendant in a
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.

See supra Part II.C.
See supra Part Il.B.
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 348 (1816).
Id.
See supra Part 11.F.

405.

See supra notes 402-03 and accompanying text.

406.

See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
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foreign court faces less risk of such prejudice than a plaintiff. If anything,
the foreign defendant often may be at a greater risk. Nevertheless,
removal barriers ensure that federal courts will adjudicate an artificially
reduced number of cases in which a defendant fears such prejudice. In
short, there is no reason why plaintiffs should enjoy a superior right to
forum selection. Such favoritism defies central considerations of judicial
impartiality, lacks any textual basis, and produces no perceivable
institutional benefits for the judiciary.
2.

Federalism

Federal courts incorrectly contend that federalism requires strict limits
on removal. The Framers extensively balanced and weighed issues of
federalism before drafting a Constitution that envisioned the exercise of
diversity jurisdiction by the lower federal courts. Indeed, many of the
same men who drafted the Constitution made it one of their first
legislative acts to provide both for the creation of lower federal courts
and for the exercise of diversity jurisdiction. 4" 7 These same individuals
also thought it was essential to create a mechanism allowing for removal
to a federal court. Therefore, removal is not an anomaly at tension with
our federal system of government, but rather is an essential component
of the original federal scheme created by the Framers. The Constitution,
not the removal statutes, imposes limits on state sovereignty. In other
words, "federalism," as defined by the Framers, includes a mechanism
for the exercise of removal jurisdiction.
The last 200 years have witnessed a consistent, widespread, and
relentless erosion of state sovereignty. For example, state legislatures no
longer elect United States Senators, independent state militias have been
replaced by a National Guard, and federal statutes and regulations
encroach upon hundreds of areas previously considered matters of local
concern, such as schools, labor laws, land use regulation, and healthcare.
Although these developments would undoubtedly strike many of the
Framers as inconsistent with the federal system of government created
200 years ago, one thing that would not surprise them is the exercise of
removal jurisdiction by federal courts.
Some courts arguing for a strict construction of removal statutes have
suggested that what actually concerns them is not so much the
encroachment upon state sovereignty by the federal judiciary but the

407. See Warren, supra note 62, at 57 (noting that members of the Constitutional
Convention who also served on the Senate Committee drafted the bill for the Judiciary
Act of 1789).
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....
408
unseemliness of one court divesting another court of jurisdiction.
Such
concerns hinge more upon judicial courtesy than upon the structural
nature of our federal system. In other words, "comity" sometimes is
used as a synonym for "federalism. '
Nevertheless, the comity argument appears somewhat contrived in the
context of removal. State courts have given little indication that they
consider it an affront to their dignity to have a case transferred to federal
court. Given the persistent plea by many state courts that their dockets
are overcrowded, a far grater concern of state courts may well be that
federal courts will relieve the congestion on their own dockets at the
expense of state courts. 41" Thus, whether "federalism" concerns are
phrased in terms of comity or in the need to protect state sovereignty,
they do not provide plausible grounds for judicially created impediments
to the exercise of a defendant's removal rights.

3.

Limited Nature of FederalJurisdiction

Another reason advanced for restricting removal is the notion that
federal courts of limited jurisdiction might expand their own power
beyond the prescribed limits. This argument represents the conservative
notion of judicial restraint, but restraint in the exercise of removal
jurisdiction is no judicial virtue. The Constitution and Congress, not the
courts, define the limits of federal jurisdiction. Therefore, it is an
abdication by the courts of their institutional role to assume less
jurisdiction than Congress has granted them. As Justice Marshall noted:
It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it
should not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if
it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a
measure because it approaches the confines of the constitution.
We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever
doubts, with whatever difficulties, a cases may be attended, we
must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more
right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, that
to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be
treason to the constitution. '
408. See, e.g., Dardeau v. W. Orange-Grove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 43 F. Supp. 2d
722, 730 (D.E.D. Tex. 1999); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Safety Nat'l Gas. Corp., 43 F.
Supp. 2d 734, 741 D.E.D. Tex. 1999).
409. See, e.g., Dardeau, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 730; Bristol Meyers, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 741.
410. See generally Victor E. Flango, How Would the Abolition of Federal Diversity
Jurisdiction Affect State Courts?, 74 JUDICATURE 35 (1990) (discussing the impact that

elimination of diversity jurisdiction would have on the federal caseload).
411. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821). See also Kline v. Murray, 7 F.2d 404,
406 (D. Mont. 1925) (noting with respect to removal that "[t]oo often has overcaution
ceded jurisdiction which ought to be jealously maintained-within valid statutory limits").
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In any event, it is senseless to use a procedural device like removal as a
mechanism for limiting the substantive reach of federal jurisdiction.
Blaming removal for overextending federal jurisdiction is the rough
equivalent of scolding the mailman because you receive too much junk
mail. In both cases, the complaint is misdirected at the delivery
mechanism, not the source. 411

4.

The Consequences of a Mistake

Judicial economy and efficiency were the original reasons for imposing
restrictions on removal. Ever since Kessinger and Fitzgerald, federal
courts have argued that it is better to decline a case of questionable
jurisdiction than to mistakenly assert jurisdiction and render a
meaningless judgment.4 3 If a federal court mistakenly retains jurisdiction
over a removed case, the parties and the courts admittedly may incur
unnecessary costs. If, however, a court incorrectly remands a case over
which federal jurisdiction exists, the defendant forever loses his right to a
federal forum. Thus removal represents one of the few areas in
American jurisprudence where a single judge is given virtually unlimited
discretion to decide a party's rights without any possibility of review.
This problem was forcefully identified in a 1927 decision from the
District of Indiana:
Every court should desire that a reviewing court shall have an
opportunity to pass on a doubtful question. It is contrary to the
spirit of our Constitution and laws, and repugnant to the sense
of fair play so indelibly instilled in the American people, that a
judge, who, after all, is a mere man, and subject to the same
emotions, passions, and prejudices as other men, should have
the right or desire to decide important questions affecting
substantial rights of litigants without giving the party feeling
aggrieved the right of appeal to some other and higher tribunal,
and this should not and will not be done, except in extreme
cases, where the necessity is plainly apparent.4 4
Thus, as the Eighth Circuit noted in Boatmen's,491 the inability to appeal a
remand order provides a compelling reason not to adopt a presumption
in favor of remand.

412. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 349. Moreover, using restrictions on
removal as a device for limiting federal jurisdiction means that defendants alone suffer the
consequences of judicial humility. As Justice Story noted, "[sluch a state of things can, in
no respect, be considered as giving equal rights."
413.
414.
415.

See supra notes 145, 149 and accompanying text.
See Niccum v. N. Assurance Co.. 17 F. 2d 160, 164 (D. Ind. 1927).
See supra notes 157-67 and accompanying text.
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In fact, and as this article has pointed out, the practical results of
restrictions on removal have not furthered judicial economy or
efficiency. To the contrary, such presumptions have spawned a system
where parties waste significant resources arguing over questions that
have divided federal courts for decades. Presumptions against removal
also have led to the creation of removal barriers that encourage
procedural gamesmanship and decrease public confidence in the judicial
system. Contrary to the expectations of decisions like Kessinger and
Fitzgerald, it is the presumption against removal that has led
416 to "a
practice that protracts and fosters litigation and multiplies costs.
VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR A CHANGE

A.

Abandonment of PresumptionsAgainst Removal

As a practical matter, the current state of federal removal jurisdiction
presents the legal system in a less than positive light. Plaintiff's lawyers
play games attempting to avoid federal jurisdiction, while clients spend
enormous sums of money fighting technical battles.
Congress
consistently strives to make the removal process both fair and uniform,
however, today it is neither. As one district court aptly noted, "[tihis
cannot be what Congress had in mind. Congress created the removal
process to protect defendants. It did not extend such protection with one
' 4
hand, and with the other give plaintiffs a bag of tricks to overcome it. ,I
Additionally, as Justice Frankfurter remarked: "[W]hile exercises in
procedural dialectics so rampant in the early nineteenth century still hold
for me intellectual interest, I do not think they should determine
litigation in the middle 4 of the twentieth, even when based merely on
diversity of citizenship. 1
Assuming that agreement can be reached that removal practice is
flawed, the focus should turn to repairing the system. Instinctively, one
might argue that Congress should decide whether the problems
associated with removal jurisdiction are severe enough to warrant
remedial legislation. Academic commentators have often argued for
legislation designed to address one or more problems associated with the
federal removal law.4 9 Similarly, in 1988, the American Law Institute

416.
417.
418.

Fitzgerald v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 45 F. 812, 821 (D. Neb. 1891).
McKinney v. Bd. of Trs. of Md. Cmty. Coll., 955 F. 2d 924, 928 (4th Cir. 1992).
Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574, 586 (1954)

(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
419.

See, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 106 (proposing amendment to permit review of

remand orders).
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advanced a proposal to abandon the one-year limit on the removal of
411"
diversity cases.
Nevertheless, such arguments mistake both the cause of current
problems and the likelihood that corrective legislation could provide a
quick fix. Upon reviewing the procedural anomalies that have crept into
federal removal law, it becomes apparent that fault lies not with
legislative drafters, but with the federal judiciary. In applying the most
rigid presumptions against removal, federal courts have transformed the
removal practice into an absurd test that even experienced litigators
routinely fail. Because legislation did not create the existing problems,
no reason should prompt the belief that further legislation will solve
those problems.
Realistically, to restore removal practice to its original constitutional
role, nothing less than a fundamental judicial change of heart is required.
Federal courts should abandon the presumptions they have created and
view questions of removal practice in a fair and neutral manner.
Perhaps, if federal judges reviewed the history of federal removal
practice, they too would find it inappropriate to defer to a plaintiff's
"supposedly" superior right to select the judicial forum. Instead, they
might be persuaded by the long-held view that removal is a vital
structural component of the American judicial system empowered by the
constitution. They might even resurrect the previously held belief that a
defendant has a constitutional right to remove certain cases to federal
court. At a minimum, the rampant gamesmanship sanctioned under the
current removal scheme should cause federal courts to critically examine
the policy arguments used to justify presumptions against removal. The
goals courts seek through restricting removal must be weighed against
the institutional harm inflicted by a system that encourages procedural
maneuvering and deceptive practice.
It might appear wildly unrealistic to hope for such a fundamental
transformation of judicial attitudes that have become deeply entrenched
over the course of half a century. But the case is not a hopeless one. The
420. See American Law Institute (ALI), Federal Judicial Code Revision Project, 142
Tentative Draft. No. 3 (Apr. 30, 1999).
421. For example, Congress could decide to enact an amendment that makes it clear
that the one-year bar to removal of diversity cases is subject to equitable exceptions. That
amendment, of course, would be interpreted by the same federal courts that have erected
barriers to removal in the first instance. How likely is it that these same courts will
interpret a statute allowing equitable exceptions broadly?
Is it more likely that
longstanding judicial presumptions against removal would require a strict construction of
any amendment? Wouldn't the policy justifications repeatedly voiced by the courts
(federalism, efficiency, etc.) require a strict construction? And, even if the courts did
construe a particular remedial statute liberally, wouldn't new judicially created procedural
barriers to removal simply emerge in the future?
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Supreme Court decision in Murphy Brothers quite dramatically
demonstrates that courts can implement Congress's desire that removal
practice be fair, uniform, and balanced. All that is required is a
commonsense approach to statutory interpretation that does not always
begin with a presumption favoring remand.
B.

EliminatingRemoval Traps

It is beyond the scope of this article to consider every area of removal
practice that could benefit from the abandonment of the presumption
against removal. Each of the judicially created barriers discussed in this
article has its own historical, political, and practical implications.
Nevertheless, it is appropriate to mention a few areas where, in the
author's opinion, judicial reform is most necessary. Prime candidates for
reform include:
1. EquitableExceptions to the One-year Bar on the Removal of Diversity
Actions.
Currently, no statutory prohibition exists against the application of
traditional equitable exceptions to the one-year bar when a plaintiff has
engaged in gamesmanship to defeat removal. The single most important
step the courts could take to reduce procedural manipulation would be to
follow Tedford and allow equitable exceptions when necessary.
2. The Rule of Unanimity.
Nothing in the removal statutes suggest that a plaintiff may defeat a
defendant's removal rights by selectively orchestrating the timing of
service upon defendants. To prevent such gamesmanship, courts should
allow removal to occur within thirty days of service upon the last-served
defendant.
3. Application of the Well-Pleaded Complaint Doctrine.
The Well-Pleaded Complaint doctrine is a judicial creation that
appears reasonable when the party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction
is the same party that drafted the operative pleading. However, courts
should apply the rule less stringently when a plaintiff drafts his complaint
in a manner designed to defeat a defendant's right to removal.
4. Calculationof the Amount in Controversy.
The calculation of the "amount in controversy" with regards to
removal cases is a topic that requires greater consideration. At a
minimum, courts that consider the defendant's compulsory counterclaim
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when calculating the amount in controversy for cases filed in federal
court should apply the same rule to cases removed to federal court.
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